



A man is held pending extradition to a state where he is wanted to stand
trial or to finish a prison term from which he escaped. He brings habeas
corpus, seeking to avoid extradition, arguing that because of past or prospec-
tive deprivations of his constitutional rights by the demanding state he ought
not be returned. This is the paradigm fact situation with which this Comment
will be concerned. The issue is whether a court in the asylum state 1 should
consider such allegations, if proved, ground for relief,2 and if so, what relief is
appropriate.
The proper resolution of the issue is of obvious interest to the petitioners
and to the asylum and demanding states involved; likewise it is of consider-
able importance to a court called upon both to do justice to the petitioner be
fore it and to accord due weight to institutional limitations upon its authority.
The proffered proof of almost unbelievable barbarities, which is the gravamen
of the petition in many of the cases, adds to the urgency that the decision
reached be the proper one. But the issue, which we shall call that of the proper
scope of extradition habeas corpus, is of much wider significance than the
situation which gives it birth. Determining the proper scope of a hearing on
extradition habeas corpus requires an examination of - and in turn throws
light upon - a number of the most important problems of constitutional law
and of the political philosophy of federalism. If a petitioner seeks the writ in a
federal court in the asylum state, the federalism problem takes the form of the
question: what is the proper relationship of the lower federal courts to state
judicial processes - to the asylum state courts' responsibility in the extradi-
tion process, and to the criminal process of the demanding state? If a petitioner
seeks relief in a state court, the federalism problem is that of the proper re-
lationship between the judicial processes of sister states; this seems to be an
instance of the application of the spirit of full faith and credit, which precludes
one state's courts from inquiring behind the surface validity of a sister state's
judicial processes. Underlying the various demands of federalism is the cryptic
prescription of the Constitution's extradition clause:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on De-
mand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.'
1. "Asylum state" is used throughout this Comment to designate the state in which
a petitioner is held pending extradition; the "demanding state" is the state which hag
requested extradition.
2. While it is logically subsidiary, the issue usually presented in the cases is whether
a court in the asylum state should hear evidence on a petitioner's allegations.
3. U.S. Coxsr. Art. IV, § 2.
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In opposition to the institutional demands of federalism is the importance of
securing to individuals the national guarantees embodied in the fourteenth
amendment. Conflict between these two principles is a recurring theme of
American law; but because the conflict is raised in a particularly immediate
and clear manner by the issue of the proper scope of extradition habeas corpus,
a successful accommodation in that limited context may serve to illuminate a
host of analogous and important problems.
The conflict has only recently become a significant one with respect to
extradition habeas corpus. Toward the end of the 1940's a substantial number
of prisoners awaiting extradition began to seek habeas corpus in asylum states,
alleging not that the demand for extradition was technically imperfect - the
traditional narrow grounds for relief - but rather that past or prospective
deprivations of their constitutional rights by demanding states made extradi-
tion inappropriate. With respect to the past deprivations they had suffered,
the general theory upon which the petitioners sought relief was that their con-
viction and confinement in violation of the Constitution afforded no adequate
basis for extradition; held in the asylum states for the sole purpose of extradi-
tion, their restraint was therefore as invalid as the demand upon which it was
predicated. With respect to the future deprivations they would allegedly
suffer, the petitioners' theory was that extradition should not be permitted to
accomplish unconstitutional ends. For a number of reasons, not the least of
which were the injustices and cruelties alleged, courts were disposed to con-
sider these petitions more sympathetically than the history of extradition habeas
corpus might have led one to expect. The state and federal courts began to
suggest a number of doctrines to cope with this novel problem. Writers in legal
periodicals began to analyze the courts' innovations, to criticize what the courts
had done, and to propose alternative responses. While this area of law was
still in ferment, the Supreme Court delivered two decisions which seemed to
foreclose further developments by limiting extradition habeas corpus to its
traditional narrow scope. If this was its intent, the Court was immediately
successful. But the compelling quality of the allegations thus denied a hearing,
the Court's careless handling of the two cases which reached it, and the
radical change in the Court's general conception of the role of habeas corpus
which has come in the intervening years, all suggest that were a new case
presented to it the Court might well reach a different result. Until that hap-
pens, it may be possible to persuade the state and lower federal courts to put
as narrow a construction upon the Court's decisions as they will bear, or even
to refuse to follow them on the ground that they no longer represent the law.
4
For extradition habeas corpus, as the Supreme Court has left it, is an anomaly.
As a general rule, federal habeas corpus has become a remedy always available
as a last resort to a man seeking to challenge the constitutionality of his
custody. Perhaps the most striking exception to this rule is to be found in
extradition habeas corpus, where federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
4. See notes 208-18 infra and accompanying text.
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have refused to hear claims that they are a petitioner's last resort - that
relief upon return to the demanding state will be unavailable, frustrated, or
ineffective.
In determining the proper scope of a habeas corpus hearing in extradition
proceedings, it is first necessary to place the question in its historical and doc-
trinal setting. Next, we shall examine in detail the various responses state
and federal courts have made to the suggestion that the scope of extradition
habeas corpus be broadened to include past and prospective deprivations of
constitutional rights as grounds for relief. Against this background, we shall
evaluate the Supreme Court's treatment of the two cases which came before it,
consider the constructions to which its opinions are susceptible, and see how
the decisions were in fact received by the state and federal courts. Finally, a
theory of the proper scope of extradition habeas corpus will be suggested, based
on the foregoing analysis.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS DOCTRINE IN EXTRADITION
CASES
In order to appreciate the recent developments with respect to the scope of
extradition habeas corpus, it is necessary first to examine in some detail cer-
tain aspects of habeas corpus doctrine generally, and their specific application
in extradition cases.
1. Habeas Corpus Doctrine - The Scope of Inquiry
Until 1867, the scope of federal habeas corpus inquiry remained limited by
its common law ancestry to the questions whether the petitioner was detained
without judicial process, or pursuant to the order of a court without juris-
diction to issue the order, or without other legal authority. In the legislative
aftermath of the Civil War, Congress extended the writ to any prisoner (state
or federal) in "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United
States." Despite this mandate to look directly to the constitutionality of chal-
lenged custody, however, the federal courts continued to consider themselves
bound by the talisman "jurisdiction" until it was abandoned in a series of cases
roughly contemporaneous with the developments in extradition habeas corpus
with which we are concerned.7 Prior to this abandonment, the federal courts
5. But cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404-06 (1963).
6. 14 Stat. 385 (1867), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1958). The constitutionality of the
extension was recently challenged, and sustained, in United States cx rel. Elliott v. Hen-.
dricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
7. See Note, The Freedomn-Writ - The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus,
61 HAnv. L. REv. 657, 661 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Freedom Writ] ; Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174 (1947) ; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; Cochran
v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). Cf. In re
Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 851, 372 P.2d 304, 305 (1962) :
The allegations of the petition stated a good cause for relief by habeas corpus.
The California courts have used the writ not only to test jurisdiction, but also to
protect the fundamental basic rights of prisoners. Thus the writ has been used to
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achieved almost the same results as would have flowed from a direct con-
sideration of constitutionality by expanding the concept of "jurisdiction" be-
yond theretofore recognizable limits.8 Thus, besides the formal requirements
of jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, and jurisdiction to impose
the particular detention complained of, the concept that a court could lose
"jurisdiction" by depriving the defendant of fundamental rights at trial came
into being.9 The constitutionality of the statute proceeded under 10 also came
to be considered "jurisdictional" and hence subject to collateral attack by fed-
eral habeas corpus. This vast expansion of the scope of the writ came perilously
close to overthrowing the basic rule that habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy to be reserved for extraordinary problems - in particular that, as a
collateral attack (and one with the special virtue that the normal principle of
res judicata does not apply 11), it must not be allowed to usurp the function
of the normal process of appeal. Only the rule that habeas corpus will not lie if
the petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies has prevented the writ
from becoming an alternative route of appeal for any error at a state trial which
a federal court deems of constitutional dimension.'-
Simultaneous with the expansion and ultimate abandonment of the talisman
"jurisdiction," the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus was being deepened. While
at common law the validity of detention was determined on habeas corpus on
examine allegations by prisoners that they were beaten ...or denied religious
freedom . . . or prevented from effectively communicating with counsel ...or the
courts. . . . If it were a fact that cruel, inhuman, or excessive punishment had
been inflicted on petitioner it would have been an invasion of his fundamental
constitutional rights, entitled to protection under both the federal and state Con-
stitutions.
See, for incredible confusion in the period of transition, Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19
(1939).
8. See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F2d 857, 871-72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 325 U.S. 890
(1945), and cases cited therein. See also In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894), for the analy-
sis of "jurisdiction" which led to the expansion.
9. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
10. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) ; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
11. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1963); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
214 (1950). But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958) ; Freedomn Writ 669-70.
12. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), holding that the use of an
incorrect test for the competence of a confession - without a finding that the proper test
would have excluded the confession - is a sufficient denial of due process that habeas
corpus will lie. See generally, for a fuller discussion of the matter covered in this para-
graph, Freedom Writ. See Fay v. Noia, supra note 11, for a further expansion: failure
to take an available state remedy - unless wilfull - is not an adequate state ground
supporting a conviction challenged on federal habeas corpus. There had been some
authority to the effect that if the petitioner had had his claim fully litigated in the state
courts, and had thus received the fundamental fairness to which he was entitled by the
fourteenth amendment, the writ would not lie. See Freedom Writ 667-68; Frank v. Man-
gum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). But cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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the basis of the adequacy of the return to the writ - that is, the allegations of
fact in the return could not be controverted and the question of "jurisdic-
tion" was determined from the sufficiency of the formal papers alone 13 - the
Supreme Court gradually substituted a review which "cuts through all forms
and goes to the very tissue of the structure."'1 4 The habeas corpus hearing has
thus become a full-dress factual inquiry whenever the alleged deprivation turns
upon disputed facts.'6 As part of the same trend toward maximizing the avail-
ability of the writ, the courts have developed very liberal standards of pleading
in habeas corpus cases.16
In still a third direction, habeas corpus was being infused with a new and
radical potency. Traditionally, the only remedy a court could grant a petitioner
was full release.17 Despite a federal statute and several Supreme Court cases
13. See Revisers' Note to 28 U.S.C. § 2248 (1958) ; Frank v Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
330 (1915).
14. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Frank v. Mangum, vipra note 13, at 346. The
majority did not disagree; it pointed out that for the "bare legal review" of the common
law writ had been substituted
a more searching investigation, in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set
forth the truth of the matter respecting the causes of his detention, and the court,
upon determining the actual facts, is to "dispose of the party as law and justice
require.'
Id. at 330-31. See also Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) ; Cochran v. Kinsas, 316 U.S.
255 (1942). This deepened scope is now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 2248 (1958). It is
part of a general trend toward scrutiny of the facts involved in a constitutional claim.
See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
15. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941), held that ex parte affidavits are not
enough to support a factual determination against petitioner. Issues of law may be sum-
marily disposed of on the basis of the petition and return (id. at 284) ; but if an issue of
fact is raised, a hearing must be held at which competent evidence is introduced, and
witnesses must be subject to cross-examination (id. at 285-87). "The Government's con-
tention that [petitioner's] allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to
deny him an opportunity to support them by evidence. On this record it is his right to
be heard." Id. at 287. 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1958) codifies a rule somewhat different from
the Walker rule: affidavits are admissible in the court's discretion, but if admitted the
opposing party has a "right to propound written interrogatories to the afliants, or to
file answering affidavits." A petitioner has a right to be present at the hearing if facts
are in dispute. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958). Cf. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 20. (1932).
16. See, for discussion, Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862-63, 867-69 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945). See, as examples, Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F2d 443,
444 (6th Cir. 1944), on appeal from remand, 148 F.2d 728, cert. denied, 325 U.S, 887
(1945); In re Brabson's Petition, 167 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
17. See Comment, Habeas Corpus - Relief Other Than Release, 10 011o ST. L.J.
370-71 (1949). The deadening effect of this limitation upon efforts to liberalize the avail-
ability of the writ, and upon the willingness of courts to grant it, is obvious. The limita-
tion had a less obvious, but equally important impact: only if the detention itself was
unauthorized could the writ be granted - it did not extend to important situations in
which release would not be appropriate: unauthorized treatment during lawful detention,
detention in an unauthorized place, or to such things as the validity of a sentence which
a petitioner was not currently serving, but which, by extending the total period of his
prospective detention, made him ineligible for parole. See Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d
[Vol. 74:'78
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suggesting that relief less than release was permissible,' 8 it was not until
Dowd v. Cook,19 decided in 1951, that the Supreme Court made absolutely
clear that the federal courts are not faced with the dilemma "of having to
choose between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner and denying
him all relief. The District Court has power in habeas corpus proceedings to
'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' "20 In the interim, some
courts, notably the Sixth Circuit in Coffin v. Reichard (1944),21 had come
out strongly for relief other than release, arguing that unauthorized treatment
during lawful custody can be considered on habeas corpus.22 There are, of
32 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied, 194 F.2d 917, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952) ; Morton v.
Steele, 217 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 974 (1955); Kemmerer v.
Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948) [but see It re Kem-
merer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied sub non:. Kemmerer v. Michi-
gan, 329 U.S. 767 (1946)] ; McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). But cf. for the modern
rule on parole eligibility, United'States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F2d 742, 749 (2d
Cir. 1956) ; United States ex rel. Donahue v. LaVallee, 213 F. Supp. 439, 440 N.D.N.Y.
1963). This traditional limitation had been anomalous since 1874, when Congress provided
that a habeas corpus case be disposed of "as law and justice require." (This language
seems first to have occurred in REv. STAT. § 761 (1873-74), now 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).)
Nor had the tradition been consistently followed, at least since the 1890's. In a number
of cases, the Supreme Court itself had granted what amounted to relief less than release
wit out discussing the issue. In In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894), the Supreme Court
ordered the petitioner released because part of the sentence imposed was not within the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court; but the Court stated that wher error is in the sentence
only, there is no reason why the sentencing court cannot resume jurisdiction over a pe-
titioner released on habeas corpus and resentence him. In a case the same year, United
States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894), involving another partially void, but separable,
sentence, the Court remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether to dismiss the
petition for habeas corpus and let the petitioner seek a writ of error, or to allow the writ
and remand the petitioner to prison, with directions to enforce only the legal part of the
sentence. Almost unnoticed, the entering wedge of relief less than release developed. See
also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960)
(remand of petitioner to the court of appeals with directions to hold him pending retrial
by the state in accordance with the Court's decision - in default whereof, petitioner to
be discharged).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
20. Id. at 209-10. The Court occasionally manifests continuing confusion on the point.
See dictum of Brennan, J., ir Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963). See also, for
post-Dowd confusion, Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), rehearing den icd, 194
F2d 917, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Morton v. Steele, 217 F.2d 13 (Sth Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 974 (1955) ; Hedge v. Heinze, 165 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal.
1958).
21. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), on appeal fron remand, 148 F.2d 278, cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945). See also Louie Yung v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Idaho 1934).
22. Any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired into on habeas corpus
... [citing Bonner]. This rule applies although a person is in lawful custody. His
conviction and incarceration deprive him only of such liberties as the law has or-
dained he shall suffer for his transgressions.
143 F.2d at 445. The court reversed a dismissal of the petition and remanded for a hear-
ing on the merits of the claim of unauthorized, cruel and unusual punishment. Remand
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
course, two problems: whether relief less than release is permissible when re-
lease itself would be proper if it were the exclusive remedy available; and
whether the availability of relief less than release enables the courts to con-
sider questions on habeas corpus which do not go to the validity of the custody
per se, but only to issues (e.g. cruel treatment) arising out of legitimately
imposed custody. The Supreme Court has only clearly answered the former
in the affirmative; Coffin answered the latter in the affirmative also, and were
the question presented to the Court today, it seems almost certain that it would
agree.
23
2. Habeas Corpus Doctrine - Exhaustion and Comity
While the scope of a habeas corpus inquiry was being broadened in terms of
the concept of "jurisdiction," deepened in terms of the nature of the hearing,
and expanded to cover the nature as well as the validity of custody, the avail-
ability of the writ was being severely restricted from an entirely different di-
rection - procedure. In Ex parte Royall (1886),24 shortly after the 1867 ex-
tension of the scope of federal habeas corpus to include state prisoners whose
custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States,2 3 the Court announced the "exhaustion of state remedies" doctrine.
The relief sought by the petitioner made the Court's decision nearly inevitable:
Royall sought federal relief from detention pending state trial for an offense
under state law. The Court rightly apprehended that if the new grant of habeas
corpus jurisdiction were taken to permit unrestrained federal interlocutory
attacks upon state criminal processes, results intolerable to the federal system
and to the states' administration of criminal justice would quickly follow.2 0
to prison with directions that petitioner's rights be respected, or to the Attorney General
with instructions to transfer the petitioner to another institution, were suggested by the
court as appropriate relief. Such remand subject to a condition is the most frequent mode
of relief other than release. See United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894) (apparently
the first such case) ; cases cited in notes 23 & 193 (multiple offender cases) in ra; Dorsey
v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) (remand with direc-
tions to release unless the court's order that petitioner be given a medical reexamination
as to his sanity be carried out is the exclusive remedy when petitioner seeks release from
a mental hospital).
23. See In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304 (1962) ; Miller v. Overholser, 206
F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Thompson v. Cavell, 158 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.Pa. 1957);
Evans v. Madigan, 154 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.Cal. 1957). Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 472 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting) ; United States ex rel. Smith
v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742, 749 (2d Cir. 1956). But see the Williams, Morlon and Modge
cases, supra note 20. In re Brabson's Petition, 167 F.Supp. 619, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
contains an exhaustive list of cases to the effect that habeas corpus does not lie where
full release would not be an appropriate remedy.
24. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
25. 14 Stat. 385 (1867); now 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1958).
26. Congress, apparently, had been oblivious to the disaster which the change might
have wrought:
Congress seems to have had no thought . . . that a state prisoner would abide
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If fedetalism is to retain any vitality, the states, through their courts, should
in general have the first opportunity to appraise the constitutionality of their
own conduct. The Court stated that "it is clear that, if the local statute under
which Royall was indicted be repugnant to the Constitution, the prosecution
against him has nothing upon which to rest, and the entire proceeding against
him is a nullity," 27 and that a court is without jurisdiction to try a defendant
under an unconstitutional statute.es Nonetheless, the Court went on to sanction
the exercise of discretion by the lower federal courts in considering when to
hear petitions from state prisoners, "that discretion, however, to be subordi-
nated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action." -  The Court
emphasized that this discretion not to issue the writ before trial, or after trial
but before appeal, was to be exercised always in light of the needs of federal-
state comity.30 The irony of the Royall case is that a rule which ultimately
became a mandatory requirement of abstention originated with the holding
state court determination of his constitutional defense - the necessary predicate
of direct review by this Court [which was by right at the time] - before resorting
to federal habeas corpus. Rather, a remedy almost in the nature of remoral from
the state to the federal courts of state prisoners' constitutional contentions seems
to have been envisaged.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963). The Court, faced with more parver than it felt
was wise for it and the federal courts in general to exercise, was forced to create a rule
of self-restraint. Id. at 417-18.
27. 117 U.S. at 248.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 253. The Court said that although there may be such special circumstances
justifying federal intervention before a state trial, the petition shows no reason why the
state courts should not hear the claims raised (id. at 252) ; the federal courts may not
presume that state courts will not give petitioners fair hearings on their constitutional
claims (ibid.).
30. Id. at 253. The origin of the exhaustion rule as one of poslponcmcnt of the federal
right to habeas corpus is emphasized in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963). Two
routes were open to the Court in Royvall: to hold that detention pending trial under an
allegedly unconstitutional statute is not "custody in violation of the Constitution ...of
the United States" because every state law is presumed to be constitutional until found
otherwise, and that the petitioner had ample opportunity to challenge the statute in the
state courts; in the alternative, the Court could hold that notwithstanding the custody w-as
in violation of the Constitution, a federal court had discretion to decline to issue the writ.
The former course, because it would have couched the matter in terms of the propriety
of the detention, would have been more consistent with the mandatory language of the
habeas corpus statute and the tradition of habeas corpus, in which the writ had been
conceived of as the right of a person improperly detained. Without considering this possi-
bility, however, the Court embraced the latter alternative. See, for the traditional con-
ception of habeas corpus, DicEy, THE LAW OF THE CoxsTrruTON 214 (10th ed. 1959).
See also Fay v. Noia, supra, at 438-39 & n.44, for a clearly manifested intent on the part
of the Court to limit the notion of the writ as discretionary. REv. STAT. § 755 (1875), now,
with minor changes in phraseology, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958):
A court ... shall forthwith award the writ . . . unless it appears from the applica-
tion that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto. [emphasis added]
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that federal courts have discretion not to issue the writ :31 the exception soon
became the rule.
In Whitten v. Tomlinson (1895),32 the Court stated the rule in its positive
form: except in "peculiar and urgent cases, the courts of the United States will
not discharge the prisoner by habeas corpus in advance of a final determination
of his case in the courts of the State . . ." and even then, a petitioner should
normally be left to "the usual and orderly course of proceeding by writ of error
from this court."33 Gradually, the rule became hardened until in Ex parte
Hawk (1944) 34 the Court made clear that in the absence of special circum-
stances the lower federal courts mst refuse the writ unless the petitioner has
exhausted the remedies available to him in the state courts, including such
collateral remedies as habeas corpus. Finally, in 1948, the judicially developed
rule was codified in what is now 28 U.S.C. section 2254:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies avail-
able in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if lie
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available proce-
dure, the question presented.3,
Bur although the exhaustion rule itself may be said to have come, at least
temporarily, to the end of its development at about the same time as the prob-
lem of the scope of extradition habeas corpus arose, some of its facets were
very much in flux. Immediately before the enactment of section 2254, the
Court had held that only one route of state review of a petitioner's claim need
be exhausted.30 At the time of the Supreme Court decisions stifling the de-
velopment of a broad-scope inquiry on extradition habeas corpus, it was not
clear that the same rule would apply despite the second paragraph of section
31. The lower court had dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction. In affirming,
the Court emphasized that the decision below could be justified as a proper exercise of
discretion to postpone a federal hearing. An "original" petition presented to the Supreme
Court on the same facts was dismissed on grounds that in the circumstances it was not
appropriate for the Court, assuming it had the power, to exercise it. Ex parle Royall, 117
U.S. 254 (1886). See Ex parle Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886), for application of ti
Royall doctrine to an attempt to bring federal habeas corpus prior to appeal of a state
conviction. See also Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892), for another early example
of the concept of discretion not to issue the writ before state proceedings have terminated,
32. 160 U.S. 231 (1895).
33. Id. at 242. Once again, the petitioner was seeking federal relief in advance of
his state trial - this time on double jeopardy grounds - and the Court pointed out
that the extremely messy and obscure character of his allegations was an example of one
reason for non-intervention. Id. at 242-47.
34. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
35. 62 Stat. 960 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
36. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
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2254P3 Whether full exhaustion required, in every case, a petition for cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court from an adverse state court decision was also a
very doubtful question.38 Likewise, it was not clear whether, if petitioner's
failure to take a timely appeal meant that state remedies otherwise available
were foreclosed to him, he would be held not to have exhausted his state
remedies.39 One area of clarity, going to the essence of the federalism ration-
ale of the exhaustion doctrine, lay in the principle that any constitutional
claim petitioner sought to advance in the federal courts must first have been
presented to the state courts.40 It was also clear that the exhaustion rule does
not apply in cases where state remedies are "sham," 41 in situations where nor-
mal state remedies are not available to a petitioner 42 or are ineffective to pro-
tect his rights, or in other extraordinary circumstances.43
37. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In the interim, the Chief Judge of one
circuit had gone so far as to suggest that under § 2254, in a state which attaches no res
judicata significance to a denial of habeas corpus, a petitioner could never exhaust his
state remedies because he could always petition again for state habeas corpus. Parker,
Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 (1948).
38. Immediately before the cases concerning the scope of extradition habeas corpus,
the Court had held that the lower federal courts could weigh a failure to seek certiorari
against other factors, such as the futility of seeking it and the injustice that would result
from a denial of relief, in determining whether the petitioner had adequately exhausted
his state remedies. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). During the period of judicial
consideration of the question of the proper scope of extradition habeas corpus, the Court
held that a petition for certiorari is a necessary element of exhaustion, in the absence
of "circumstances of peculiar urgency." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 217-19 (1950),
overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
39. At least one commentator at the time thought that this was the rule, on the basis
of the import of Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). See Freedom W1rit 66667 & nn.
77-79. The issue was conclusively settled by Fay v. Noia, supra note 38: only currently
available state remedies need be exhausted, and failure to take a timely state appeal is not
an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to support custody unless the failure
was wilful.
40. See Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900), cited with approval in Darr %. Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950) ; Downs v. Hudspeth, 75 F. Supp. 945, 952 (D.Kan. 1948) (new
claims, not passed on by the state courts, must be presented to them before a federal
court will hear them) ; Beverly, Federal-State Conflicts in the Field of Habeas Corpus, 41
CAiza. L. Rv. 483, 489 (1953). But cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963): it would seem
that the rule now applies only if state remedies currently exist by which the petitioner
can raise his claim.
41. See, e.g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (concurring opinion) ; Freedom
Writ 664 & n. 54.
42. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, 183 F2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950).
See note 193 infra for discussion of this and similar cases.
43. See Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 402 (1900) ; Bacom v. Sullivan, 194 F.2d 166
(5th Cir. 1952). The burden, of course, is on the petitioner to show any such bases for
an exception, and the remoteness of chances of success in the state courts is no excuse
for a failure to exhaust, because it is to be presumed that the state courts will uphold
federal law. See Beverly, supra note 40, at 489; Freedom Vrit 665 n.72. Cf. Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 180-81 (1947).
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3. The Special Nature of Habeas Corpus in Extradition Proceedings
In 1793, Congress, although given no express power to do so, implemented
the extradition clause, setting out the specific requisites for extradition.4 4 Be-
cause it is only compliance by the demanding state with the requirements of
a valid demand which authorizes the executive authority of the asylum state
to have an alleged fugitive arrested,4r and because important personal rights
44. 1 Stat. 302 (1793), 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958):
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person
as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Ter-
ritory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found
or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the
person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified
as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from
whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District
or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and
secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent
of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to
be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within
thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.
The validity of the legislation was upheld in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885). Both
the extradition clause and the statutory implementation speak in mandatory terms;, the
Supreme Court held, however, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860),
that although the duty of the asylum state's governor is an absolute, ministerial one -
once a proper demand has been made - it is nonetheless a "moral" one, not enforceable
in the federal courts. It is not entirely clear whether the Court thought Congress could
provide for enforcement: the Court found no authority for federal mandamus either in
the extradition clause or in the statute (id. at 107) ; but it went on to say, "[W]e think
it clear, that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it. . . ." Ibid.
Whether, since the Civil War and its aftermath, the Court would be of the same opinion
is doubtful. Congress has in any case achieved a similar result, for certain named crines,
by making it a federal offence to cross state lines to avoid a state's justice; the trial is
held in the state from which the defendant fled (so that, being removed there for trial, lie
need not be extradited). Fugitive Felon Act, 48 Stat. 787 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1073 (1958).
45. See Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 6 (1909) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S, 80,
94-95- (1885) ; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 651 (1885) ; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 638 (1884); Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66, 104 (1860); Ople v.
Weinbrenner, 285 Mo. 365, 373-74, 266 S.W. 256 (1920) ; Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103
Atl. 644 (1918) ; United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716, 717 (7th Cir.
1934).
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1908), appears to be the only case in which
the Court considered the validity of a state statute less strict than the federal require-
ments - held: since the demand and arrest actually involved were stated to be pursuant
to the federal, rather than the state requirements, the question need not be deieded. The
Court has held that state legislation not inconsistent with the federal requirements is
valid. Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 133-35 (1916). Although, in Hyatt v. Corkran, 188
U.S. 691 (1903), the Court held that mere "constructive presence" in the demanding state
at the time of the alleged crime does not suffice to make petitioner extraditable as a figi-
tive from that state's justice (see also Taft v. Lord, supra), even though a crime by
"constructive presence" might be permissible qua crime, some state courts have held valid
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secured by the Constitution depend upon a strict observance of those require-
ments by demanding and asylum state alike,46 the Supreme Court held, soon
after the extension of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to persons held by the
states in violation of the Constitution,47 that an extraditee has the right to
inconsistent state legislation, patterned on § 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9
U.L.A. 297 (1957), which excludes the requirement of fugitivity in limited situations.
See cases cited at 9 U.L.A. 299-300 (1957) ; Comment, Interstate Rendition: Executive
Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97, 100 n.18, 105 n.44 (1956) [here-
inafter cited as Executive Practices]. See also Commonwealth ex reL Houser v. Seip, 5
Pa. D.&C2d 577 (C.P., Dauphin Co. 1955), aff'd on opinion below, 385 Pa. 545, 124 A2d
110 (1956) [fugitivity not required under § 5, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, 9C U.L.A. 23 (1957)]; Harrison v. State, 38 Ala. App. 60, 77 So2d 384 (1954),
cert. denied, 262 Ala. 701, 77 So2d 387 (1955) (same).
46. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 638 (1884); United States ex rel. McCline
v. Mfeyerling, 75 F.2d 716, 717 (7th Cir. 1934) ; In the Matter of Waterman, 29 Nev. 288,
292, 89 Pac. 291 (1907). However, petitioners who have sought habeas corpus in the
demanding state, alleging their forcible return there deprived them of their rights under
the extradition clause and implementing statute, have been uniformly unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) ; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Cf.
Maahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888) (erstwhile asylum state brought habeas corpus
on behalf of kidnapped ex-fugitive). The theory of these denials is that the manner in
which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect a state's right to try him. Since
Frisbie, however, there has been the development of the idea of pre-trial due process
[see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)], and the Court may well abandon the
Frisbie doctrine, since it allows kidnapping to deprive a petitioner of the procedural and
substantive rights he would have in the extradition process. Cf. Note, Bailbondsmien and
the Fugitive Accused - The Need for Formal Removal Procedures, 73 Ymrx LJ. 1093
(1964). Both under the federal kidnapping statute, 47 Stat. 326 (1932), as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (1958), and under the law of some states (see Executive Practices 103 n.36),
kidnapping as an alternative to extradition is a criminal offense.
47. Why this development did not come until after the extension of federal habeas
corpus is a revealing question. One would have supposed that since extradition is pursuant
to federal law - Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 709 (1903); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S.
80, 94-95 (1885) - an extraditee would be considered pro tanto a federal prisoner, eligible
for federal habeas corpus as a matter of course. Indeed, until Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624- (1884), there was serious question whether a state court could proceed on habeas
corpus to inquire into the validity of the detention of an extmditee, once the return to
the writ set up the federal authority under which the petitioner was held. Robb held that
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of state and federal courts in such cases is concurrent,
rejecting the argument that an agent of a demanding state appointed to receive an ex-
traditee is pro hac vice a federal officer. Id. at 630-35. See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 24
How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860). But Robb explicitly recognized that the detention of an extra-
ditee is pursuant to federal authority, pointing out that this is not decisive since state
courts have jurisdiction to determine federal questions. 111 U.S. at 635-36. Merely be-
cause the custodian is not a federal officer would not seem to change the character of the
custody. Federal prisoners, for e.xample, may be. incarcerated in state prisons [see 62 Stat.
847 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1958) ; Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) ; Rena v. United States, 58 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1932)], without prejudice to their
rights to federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., In re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (D.Ga. 1889). See
also notes 117-20 infra and accompanying text.
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challenge his custody pending extradition by habeas corpus.48 However, until
the 1940's the federal courts did not apply the exhaustion of state remedies
rule to extradition habeas corpus; they allowed an extraditee to initiate court
proceedings to vindicate his rights under the extradition clause and federal
extradition statute either in the federal or state courts of the asylum state.40
Regardless of the forum, the Court has always insisted that the questions in-
volved in extradition habeas corpus cases are federal questions, and that the
decisions of state courts are ultimately reviewable by it.60 The same scope of
48. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1885) (federal habeas corpus); Illinois
ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 109 (1907) (state habeas corpus). But a peti-
tioner does not have a right to a hearing before the asylum state's governor. Munsey v,
Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905) ; Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63, 68 (1909). HIe does,
however, have a right to insist that the governor's decision as to his fugitivity be made
"in some legal mode" and upon "competent proof." Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 652
(1885). Evidence independent of the requisition papers is not required. Marbles v. Creecy,
215 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1909). Thus the function of a court, reviewing the governor's decision,
is to determine whether, as a matter of law, it could have been reached on the basi of the
evidence before him - not to weigh the evidence de novo. Ex parte Reggel, snpra at 653.
See Executive Practices for discussion of the actual practices of governors. The narrow
scope hearing described above has been departed from somewhat by allowing in extrinsic
evidence, particularly with respect to fugitivity.
49. The theory of concurrent jurisdiction was announced in Robb v. Connolly, 111
U.S. 624 (1884), discussed in note 47 supra. For examples of cases not requiring exhaus-
tion, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Superintendent, 111 F2d 409 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 662 (1940) ; United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyerling, 75 F.2d
716 (7th Cir. 1934) ; Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
674 (1933) ; Collins v. Traeger, 27 F2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S.
52 (1921) ; Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128 (1917) ; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S.
432 (1914); Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387
(1908); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906) ; In the matter of Strauss, 197
U.S. 324 (1905) ; United States ex rel. Brown v. Cooke, 209 Fed. 607 (3d Cir. 1913).
Cf. Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J. 800, 802-03 (1950) ; Execu-
tive Practices 103 n.36. The new rule - requiring exhaustion in extradition cases also -
was announced in Kauffman v. Mount, 131 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1942); Powell v. Meyer,
147 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1945) [implicitly overruled in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d (3d Cir.),
rev'd per curiam, 388 U.S. 864 (1949)] ; Lyon v. Harkness, 151 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 782 (1946); Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
Petitioners had occasionally even been allowed to bring federal habeas corpus after
having begun, but failed to follow up their state court route. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, supra; United States ex rel. Brown v. Cooke, snpra. But ef.
Morgan v. Horrall, supra; Executive Practices 103 n.36.
50. See South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933) ; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127
(1916) ; Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909); Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease,
207 U.S. 100 (1907) ; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905) ; Hyatt v. People ex rtl.
Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903). Thus in the Bailey case, supra, the Court reversed a state
court for releasing a petitioner who had failed to meet the federal standards for release
on extradition habeas corpus; and the Seventh Circuit has overridden a prior denial of
habeas corpus by a state court which failed to release a petitioner when release was war-
ranted by federal law. United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F2d 716 (7th Cir.
1934). The Bailey case may indicate that the Supreme Court's stifling of the development
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inquiry and the same standards of proof apply to federal and state extradition
habeas corpus: a petitioner is entitled to release unless the federal prerequisites
to extradition have been met.
51
The traditional "narrow scope" extradition habeas corpus proceeding, 2
based on the extradition clause aid the statute of 1793, countenances four
avenues of attack upon the validity of custody in the asylum state pending
extradition: (1) that the extradition papers are not in order, or are without
proper authentification by the demanding state's executive authority;O (2)
that the charge, whether by indictment or affidavit, is inadequate to support
extradition, or is insubstantial;54 (3) that the petitioner is not the person
named in the extradition papers ;r (4) that the petitioner is not a fugitive
from the demanding state's justice because he was not within the demanding
state at the time of the alleged offense. 0 (1) and (2) are questions of law,
"always open upon the face of the papers to judicial inquiry" on habeas cor-
pus;57 but these constitutional and statutory requirements are to be liberally
of a broad-scope of inquiry on extradition habeas corpus in the federal courts precludes
any similar liberalization in the state courts. The Pennsylvania courts so understood the
situation. See Commonwealth ex rel. Henderson v. Baldi, 372 Pa. 463, 93 A.2d 458 (1953),
and the cases following it, discussed in, note 172 infra. But ef. Koch v. O'Brien, 101 N.H.
11, 12, 131 A.2d 63, 64 (1957).
51. But cf. People ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 90 N.Y.S2d 205, 213, 196 Misc. 34,
42-43 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd ier., 93 N.Y.S.2d 729, 276 App. Div. 832 (1949), motion for
leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 762, 90 N.E.2d 69 (1950) (scope of review on extradition
habeas corpus in New York courts not necessarily controlled by federal rule). This
holding is criticized as violating the supremacy clause in Horowitz & Steinberg, The
Fourteenth Amendiment - Its Newly Recognined Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas Corpus
in Extradition, 23 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 441, 447-48 (1950). Cf. notes 45 & 50 .supra. See notes
182-97 infra and accompanying text for an argument that the scope of extradition habeas
corpus should be broader in the federal courts.
52. See, for general statements of the elements of the "narrow-scope" inquiry, Note,
8 U.C L L. REv. 342 (1941) ; Comment, The Limzits of Constitutional Inquiry on Habeas
Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 21 U. CHL L. Rzv. 735, 737-38 (1954) ; Executive Practices
104 nn.39, 40 (1956) ; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 440 (1914).
53. See, e.g., Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 (1885) (papers must include adequate
basis for asylum governor to decide that prerequisites for extradition are present);
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885); Collins v. Traeger, -27 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928).
54. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934)
(mere warrant is not a sufficient charge; petitioner released) ; In re WVaterman, 29 Nev.
288, 89 Pac. 291 (1907) (charge insufficient - indictment fails to allege essential elements
of the crime). Cf. also cases cited in notes 60-62 & 66 infra.
55. See Raftery ex rel. Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F.2d 189, 193 (1st Cir. 1932) ; United
States ex rel. Austin v. Williams, 12 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir. 1926).
56. See, e.g., Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903) (state court
properly ordered petitioner discharged since he was not in the demanding state at the
time of the crime). Cf. cases cited in note 63 infra, and discussion of fugitivity at note 45
supra. Intent to flee the justice of the demanding state is not an element of fugitivity.
Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (185).
57. Roberts v. Reilly, mpra note 56, at 95.
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construed in favor of the demanding state,58 the finding of the asylum's gov-
ernor that the papers are in order and the charge sufficient is cloaked with a
presumption of regularity not to be upset by picayune objections,8 and, most
important, the sufficiency of an indictment or affidavit as a charge of crime is
not to be tested by the technical requirements of criminal pleading 6- - the
charge is adequate if it plainly alleges a crime 0 1 and if the facts it alleges are
not impossible.6 2 (3) and (4) are questions of fact, as to which the finding
of the asylum's governor will be overridden only if petitioner can make a clear
and convincing or even conclusive case in rebuttal of the prima facie case
against him.08 This construction of the extradition clause and the implementing
58. See Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917). See, for examples of
such liberal construction, Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909) (notary is a "magis-
trate" within the meaning of the federal statute requiring an affidavit by a magistrate) ;
In the matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324 (1905) (affidavit of committing magistrate a suffi-
cient charge) ; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906) (intent to flee not an
element of fugitivity); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885) (same). See also note
65 infra.
59. Collins v. Traeger, 27 F2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928); Compton v. Alabama, 1i pra
note 58. See note 48, supra, for the rights of an extraditee before a governor.
60. See, e,.g, Commonwealth ex rel. Raucci v. Price, 409 Pa. 90, 100-01, 185 A.2d
523, 528-29 (1962); Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 55 (1921) ; Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S.
387, 401-02 (1908); Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 373 (1905) ; United States ex rd.
Darcy v. Superintendent, 111 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 662 (1940).
The sufficiency of the indictment as a charge cannot be attacked on the ground that the
statute defining the crime is unconstitutional. See note 66 infra and accompanying text,
If indictments which fail to allege the time and date at which the crime was committed
are nonetheless deemed sufficient charges, a petitioner is necessarily deprived of his right
to show he was not in the demanding state at the time of the crime. Cf. People cx rtel.
McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 110 (1907) (dictum: demanding state not necessarily
bound by specific date of crime set forth in extradition papers) ; Pearce v. Texas, 155
U.S. 311 (1894) (indictment a sufficient charge, though it omitted the time and place
of the crime).
61. See, e.g., Pierce v. Creecy, supra note 60, at 402-05: the indictment, "whether
good or bad, as a pleading, unmistakably describes every element of the crime . . . as it
is defined in the Texas Penal Code. . .. " Id. at 404. The Constitution does not require a
good indictment, or any indictment, just a charge. There is some authority that the crime
charged must in fact be a crime in the demanding state. See In re Varona, 38 Wash. 2d 833,
232 P.2d 923 (1951). Indeed, this is the implication of Pierce, supra. But the line between
this question and that of the sufficiency of the indictment as a pleading is very thin.
62. See Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 96 (1885).
63. For cases in which extraditees have shown their non-fugitivity, see, e.g., Hyatt
v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 710-12, 719 (1903) ("without contradiction and
upon conceded facts") ; Commonvealth ex rel. Dronsfield v. Hohn, 390 Pa. 434, 135 A.2d
757 (1957) ("overwhelmingly"); People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 281 N.Y. 441, 24
N.E.2d 117 (1939) ("conclusive"). For cases in which allegations of non-fugitivilty have
been rejected for failure to overcome the presumption that the asylum governor's finding
of fugitivity is correct, see, e.g., South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 422 (1933) ;
Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 56 (1921) ; People ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S.
100, 109-11 (1907); Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905); Roberts v. Reilly, 116
U.S. 80, 95 (1885) ; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 653 (1885) ; People ex rtel. Hauptmann
[Vol. 74: 78
1964] EXTRADITION HABEAS CORPUS
statute " in favor of the demanding state and the liberal presumptions of
regularity in the proceedings have traditionally been thought to flow from the
need for an efficient extradition system and from the presumption that every
demanding state can be counted upon to treat extraditees fairly.E6
v. Hanley, 153 Mfisc. 61, 63, 274 N.Y.S. 813, 816 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 257, 274
N.Y.S. 824 (1934) ; Ex parte Ople v. Weinbrenner, 285 Mo. 365, 378-79, 226 S.V. 256,
260 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 695 (1921).
Contentions which go to the innocence of the fugitive will not be considered, unless
conclusive as to his non-fugitivity. See South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 420 (1933)
("It was wholly beyond the province of the judge to speculate, as he seems to have done,
concerning the probable outcome of any trial which might follow rendition to the demand-
ing state.") ; Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (defenses - including
the statute of limitations - cannot be heard); Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1914) (petitioner alleges he could not have committed a crime because he was insane;
but the "constitutionally required surrender is not to be interfered with by the summary
process of habeas corpus upon speculations as to what ought to be the result of a trial
[in the demanding state]:') ; Commonwealth ex tel. Flower v. Superintendent, 220 Pa. 401,
411, 69 Atl. 916, 919 (1908) ; Commonvealth ex reL Raucci v. Price, 409 Pa. 90, 96-100,
185 A.2d 523, 526-28 (1962). But cf. Note, Scope of a Habeas Corpus Hearing on Inter-
state Extradition of Criminals, 53 YALE L.J. 359, 360 n.7 (1944) (if petitioner can show
indisputably he is innocent; he is not a fugitive from justice) ; People ex rel. Pahl v. Pol-
lack, 174 Misc. 981, 22 N.Y.S2d 413 (Sup. Ct. 1940), noted in 8 U.CnL L. REv. 342
(1941). There are some recent cases to the effect that if petitioner can show he was re-
leased from custody by the demanding state, he is not a fugitive. See Commonwealth
ex rel. Wadley v. Baldi, 88 Pa.D.&C. 165 (C.P., Phila. Co. 1953). Cf. the issues raised
by California's system of parole into the custody of another state in In re Kimler, 37 Cal. 2d
568, 233 P.2d 902, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951) ; In re Bailleau:x, 47 Cal. 2d 258, 302
P.2d 801 (1956). But compare United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ragen, 150 F2d 190
(7th Cir. 1945).
64. For the view that the only question on extradition habeas corpus is the conformity
of the demand to the constitutional and statutory requirements, see United States ex rel.
Brown v. Cooke, 209 Fed. 607, 608 (3d Cir. 1913), appeal disnissed, 238 U.S. 613 (1915)
(although it may be permissible for the executive authority of the asylum state to con-
sider other matters, a court may consider only whether petitioner has been "lawfully
demanded from the asylum state").
65. Courts have been free to give this [liberal] meaning to the Constitution and
statutes because in delivering up an accused person to the authorities of a sister
State they are not sending him for trial to an alien jurisdiction, with laws which
our standards might condemn, but are simply returning him to be tried, still under
the protection of the Federal Constitution, but in the manner provided by the State
against the laws of which it is charged that he has offended.
Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917).
If more were required [of indictments] it would impose upon courts, in the trial
of writs of habeas corpus, the duty of a critical examination of the laws of [de-
manding] States with whose jurisprudence and criminal procedure they can have
only a general acquaintance. Such a duty would be an intolerable burden, certain
to lead to errors in decision, irritable to the just pride of the States and fruitful of
miscarriage of justice. The duty ought not to be assumed unless it is plainly re-
quired by the Constitution, and, in our opinion, there is nothing in the letter or
spirit of that instrument which requires or permits its performance.
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 405 (1908). Cf. Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 314 (1894).
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Over the years petitioners have repeatedly tried to persuade the courts to
extend the inquiry on extradition habeas corpus to include the validity of the
proceedings in the demanding state which led up to the demand for extradi-
tion, or the nature of the conduct by the demanding state which allegedly will
follow extradition. Attempts to induce the courts to consider the constitution-
ality of the statute upon which the demanding state's charge was based, on the
theory that an unconstitutional statute is absolutely void and cannot support
For a somewhat different emphasis, see In re Waterman, 29 Nev. 288, 292, 89 Pac. 291,
292 (1907):
If a defendant is unjustly accused, or illegally charged, or restrained of his liberty,
certainly justice demands that he should not be deprived of his liberty or removed
hundreds or thousands of miles, as the case may be, there to wait or be put on trial
on an illegal charge. The sooner his detention, if it be illegal, is so ascertaincd, the
better.
Compare Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 85 (1905) (dissenting opinion). Query whether
the presumption of regularity is not even stronger in a removal case - from one federal
judicial district to another. Yet a defendant in such a case is entitled to a probable cause
hearing. See Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20, 32 (1907) ; Comment, Race Discrinhialion
and Interstate Rendition - The Crawford Case, 43 YALE L.J. 444, 452-53 (1934). See
Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739, 743 (1st Cir. 1933), for use of the removal-extradition
analogy, arguing that because the validity of an indictment found by an improperly se-
lected grand jury is not impeachable in a removal case, it should not be in extradition
cases. For criticism of the court's use of the analogy, on the ground that the function
of the indictment in an extradition case is to show probable cause, whereas on removal a
court finds probable cause independently and need not rely on the indictment, see Com-
ment, supra, at 451.
A few courts have allowed a scope of inquiry slightly broader than that sanctioned
by the extradition clause and implementing statute. The Oklahoma courts for many
years allowed a petitioner to challenge the motives of the prosecution in the demanding
state, on the theory that a "substantial charge" could not be found if extradition was
sought for some purpose (e.g. to gain jurisdiction for a civil suit) other than to put the
petitioner to his trial. In. Ex parte Offutt, 29 Okla. Crim. 401, 405, 234 Pac. 222, 224 (1025),
the "Oklahoma rule" was stated to be that, "In every extradition case the question of the
good faith of the prosecution is always open to inquiry on habeas corpus," See Note,
Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 47 CoLum. L. T, v. 470, 472 (1947). Tile rule
was apparently followed only in Oklahoma and North Dakota. See It re Cohen, 23 N.J.
Super. 209, 218-19, 92 A.2d 837, 841-42 (1952), aff'd on opinlon below, 12 N.J. 362, 96
A.2d 794 (1953) (containing a good collection and discussion of the cases and holding
that comity precludes consideration of the motivation for the demand). Most courts
refused to entertain such allegations. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.)
66, 106 (1860); United States ex re. Darcy v. Superintendent, 111 F.2d 409, 412 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 662 (1940) ; Collins v. Traeger, 27 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir.
1928) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Superintendent, 220 Pa. 401, 409-10, 69 Atl, 916,
919 (1908). The "Oklahoma rule" was abandoned by Oklahoma in Ex parte Scott, 91
Okla. Crim. 345, 219 P.2d 249 (1950) on the ground that the Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act, which had been adopted in Oklahoma, precludes it.
Some courts have been more strict in their scrutiny of the indictment than the Su-
preme Court's holdings would seem to sanction. See In re Waterman, 29 Nev. 288, 89 Pac.
291 (1907) ; In re Varona, 38 Wash. 2d 833, 232 P.2d 923 (1951) (relying on decisional




a charge of crime have been uniformly rebuffed cG A similar fate has met at-
tacks on the validity of the indictment on the ground it was procured by a
grand jury selected in violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights. " Until
recently the courts refused to receive and consider proffered evidence con-
cerning the treatment petitioner would receive after extradition: whether he
would receive a fair trial 68 and whether he would be protected from mob
violence 69 were held beyond the scope of extradition habeas corpus. 70 The
scope of inquiry was thus kept fairly within the bounds of the tradition of
habeas corpus. Since extraditees are detained pursuant to a governor's war-
rant, rather than a court order, the traditional question on extradition habeas
corpus was not that of "jurisdiction" but whether the governor had "author-
ity" to detain the petitioner. And since the habeas corpus inquiry was tradi-
tionally limited to the face of the papers, the governor's "authority" was deter-
mined only on the basis of the sufficiency of the official documents required for
extradition ;71 the realities behind the papers were largely beyond the purview
of the courts. When habeas corpus generally was extended to the realities be-
hind the formalities and the talisman of jurisdiction was abandoned, it was to
be expected that pressure would quickly arise to extend extradition habeas
corpus in a similar way - to develop a broader scope of inquiry.72
66. See Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311 (1894); Collins v. Traeger, 27 F2d 842 (9th
Cir. 1928) ; People ex rel. Gilbert v. Babb, 415 IlL 349, 354-57, 114 N.E.2d 358, 361-63
(1953). See, for an argument in support of this doctrine, Comment, The Litnits of Con-
stitutional Inquiry on; Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 21 U.Cr- L. REv. 735, 743,
749-52 (1954). The theory that a state could legitimately refuse extradition because the
demanding state's statute has no counterpart in the asylum state, and the crime is not
malum in; se, was rejected in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66, 102 (1860).
67. See Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739 (1st Cir. 1933) ; Commonwealth ex rel. John-
son v. Thomas, 50 Pa. D.&C. 626 (C.P. 1944). For a critical discussion of the Crawford
case, see Comment, 43 Ymx L.J. 444 (1934).
68. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Cooke, 209 Fed. 607 (3d Cir. 1913), appeal
dismissed, 238 U.S. 613 (1915). See also cases cited in note 69 infra. But cf. People ex
rel. Pahl v. Pollack, 174 Misc. 981, 22 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct 1940), noted in 8 U.Cu.
L. REV. 342 (1941).
69. See Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1909) ; Ex parte Ople v. WVeinbrenner,
285 Mo. 365, 226 SAV. 256 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 695 (1921).
70. See, for further discussion, Executive Practices 108 n.58, 115 n.97; Note. Scope
of a Habeas Corpus Hearing on Interstate Extrafition of Criminals, 53 YAxz 14J. 359-60
(1940) ; Note, The Case of the Fugitive from the Chain Gang, 2 STAir. L Rnv. 174, 181
(1949).
71. See Commonwealth ex rel. Flower v. Superintendent, 220 Pa. 401, 405, 69 At.
916, 917 (1908) (a court on extradition habeas corpus cannot go beyond the "jurisdictional
facts authorizing the extradition of the accused"); note 64 supra. Fugitivity is only a
partial exception. The court's essential function is to see whether the governor was pre-
sented with enough evidence to be able, as a matter of law, to conclude that the petitioner
is a fugitive. See note 48 supra. The courts have not kept the fugitivity inquiry "pure;'
however, and petitioners are allowed to introduce their own evidence.
72. See Comment, The Limits of Constitutional Inquiry on Habeas Corpus in Inter-
state Rendition, 21 U.CHL L. REv. 735, 736 (1954). This wvas early done with respect
to fugitivity. For a collection of state cases on the scope of extradition habeas corpus, see
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III. EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF EXTRADITION HABEAS CORPUS
The courts initially resisted the pressure to expand the scope of extradition
habeas corpus. Marbles v. Creecy (1909), 73 appears to have been the first
major case in which a petitioner sought to avoid extradition by trying to per-
suade the court hearing him on extradition habeas corpus that he would be
improperly treated if delivered to the demanding state. Petitioner was a Negro,
held for extradition to Mississippi where he was under indictment for assault
with intent to kill. His allegations seem to have been of a very general char-
acter, the crux of which was an asserted danger of mob violence and lynching.
The Supreme Court said:
It is clear that the executive authority of a State... need not be con-
trolled in the discharge of his duty [of rendition] by considerations of
race or color, nor by a mere suggestion - certainly not one unsupported
by proof, as was the case here - that the alleged fugitive will not be fairly
and justly dealt with in the State to which it is sought to remove himn
nor be adequately protected, while in the custody of such State, against
the action of lawless and bad men.
74
For many years the Marbles approach was generally followed by those courts
which considered the issue.
75
1. The Mattox Case
The first significant case which permitted a broad-scope inquiry on ex-
tradition habeas corpus was Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent
(1943). 76 Mattox, an adolescent Negro, was sought by Georgia from Penn-
sylvania to stand trial on a charge of assault with intent to kill - the victim
having been a white boy. The facts that Mattox' attorney brought to the at-
tention of the court showed first that Mattox was probably being framed; thus
the natural hesitancy of any court to release a probable criminal was largely
neutralized. Next, the attorney sought to bring Mattox within the exception
implicit in the holding in Marbles v. Creecy - that if a petitioner could prove,
Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae, Sweeney v. Woodall, pp. 15-21, 344
U.S. 86 (1952).
73. 215U.S. 63 (1909).
74. Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v. Cooke, 209 Fed. 607 (3d Cir. 1913),
appeal dimnissed, 238 U.S. 613 (1915) ; Ex parte Ople v. Weinbrenner, 285 Mo. 365, 226
S.W. 256 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 695 (1921).
76. 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A2d 576 (1943). Many of the details in the discussion of
the Mattox case are taken from Mattox' lawyer's account of the case. Alexander, The
Thon is Mattox Extradition Case, 2 NAT. B.J. 1 (1944).
Only one court, and that in ambiguous circumstances, seems to have released a peti-
tioner on grounds he would not be properly treated if returned, prior to the Mattox case
which initiated the development of a doctrine supporting a broader-scope inquiry on extra-
dition habeas corpus. People cx rel. Pahl v. Pollack, 174 Misc. 981, 22 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup.
Ct. 1940). Petitioner was a New Yorker, on parole in New York from a Pennsylvania
conviction. The accusations of parole violation were admittedly false, and petitioner con-
vinced the New York court that he would not be fairly treated by the Pennsylvania parole
board. See Note, 8 U.CHi. L. Rv. 342 (1941).
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rather than merely allege, great danger of mob violence and lynching, he could
be released. Convincing testimony was introduced in support of Mattox' con-
tention that prejudice was so strong against him in Georgia that he could not
possibly receive a fair trial and would be in grave danger of being lynched.
Although Georgia officials also testified, and affidavits in support of extradition
were presented, the persuasiveness of this evidence was seriously undermined
by a tactical blunder. Georgia sought to have the judge disqualified, saying, in
a letter to a Pennsylvania District Attorney which came to the attention of the
court, "we have noticed that this judge has sponsored anti-lynch legislation
and if he is sold on the subject we believe that he would be biased in this case
against the state of Georgia, and should be disqualified to sit on the same."77
The Pennsylvania courts took this to be an indication of such a complacent
attitude toward lynching as substantially to buttress Mattox' case. On the basis
of this and other material, the trial and appellate court were convinced of the
validity of Mattox' factual allegations.
The real problem, however, was to justify the inquiry at all. The trial court,
noting that there was no precedent in support of a broad-scope inquiry and
that dicta in some earlier cases seemed to oppose it, undertook to distinguish
those cases on the ground that although proper conduct by the demanding state
is strongly to be presumed, the presumption is not an irrebutable one. The
superior court agreed, reasoning from the United States Supreme Court's
independent evaluation of the facts of state cases in which constitutional rights
are at stake.7b Further, a Pennsylvania statute provided that a court on habeas
corpus should inquire into "the facts of the case." The superior court took
this as a grant of power to consider, not guilt or innocence, but all legitimate
reasons against delivering an extraditee to the demanding state.7 0 The court
held that dangers that a petitioner would not receive a fair trial, or would be
subjected to mob violence or lynching, were adequate reasons to justify a
refusal to deliverSO
The superior court affirmed the trial court's order of release, thus initiating
the doctrine that danger of irreparable injury upon return to a demanding state
is ground for relief on extradition habeas corpus. Neither the trial court nor
the superior court dealt with the serious questions of federalism raised by their
decisions. An excellent Note in the Yale Law Journal attempted to supply
some of the missing analysis. It found support for the decision in cases involv-
ing federal injunction of state criminal prosecutions; in those cases, as in
Mattox, there is an inescapable conflict between the right of an individual to
constitutional treatment, and the right of a state to try persons for crime with-
out disruptive intervention from another judicial system:
The federal courts have reconciled this conflict by saying that a state
criminal trial will be enjoined only when the individual's constitutional
77. Alexander, mspra note 76, at 7.
78. Id. at 9-12; 152 Pa. Super. at 173-74,31 A.2d at 578-79.
79. 152 Pa. Super. at 172, 31 A.2d at 578.
80. Id. at 172-73, 31 A.2d at 578.
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rights are in great and immediate danger of being irreparably impaired.
In the Mattox case the relator clearly showed that he was in great and
immediate danger of being irreparably lynched, and the Pennsylvania
court would seem, therefore to have come within the rule of the federal
injunction cases, assuming that Mattox had a constitutional right not to
be lynched capable of being infringed.81
81. Note, Scope of a Habeas Corpus Hearing on Interstate Rendition of Criminals, 53
YAm L.J. 359, 362-63 (1944). Some of the federal injunction cases are collected. Id. at
363 n.31. The author does fail to note the crucial difference that in the injunction cases
it is a federal court which interferes with a state's judicial process. See notes 182-97
infra and accompanying text, where the power of state courts is distinguished from that of
federal courts in extradition proceedings. The tension in the injunction cases is, as tile
Note-writer suggests, between the theory that state courts should have the first oppor-
tunity to construe state statutes and appraise their constitutionality, on the one hand, and
the feeling that this abstract proposition of deference to the states should not promote
irreparable deprivations of constitutional rights, on the other hand. See generally Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAW. L. REv. 345 (1930), and Taylor & Willis,
The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YAL LJ. 1169
(1933), for general discussions of federal injunctions of state court proceedings. With
certain limited exceptions, an injunction will lie only prior to the commencement of state
proceedings. This result was reached in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), by statu-
tory construction, but might equally well have been derived directly from comity: once
actual proceedings have begun, no greater harm will come from testing the constitution-
ality of the state law in the state courts than from doing so in the federal courts. Analo-
gously, in extradition habeas corpus, the interference with the demanding state's criminal
justice is only warranted before the petitioner has been able to secure a hearing in that
state's courts - i.e., before he has been extradited.
Some of the more important injunction cases (involving criminal proceedings) are:
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1935); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1935); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S,
521 (1932) ; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) ; Packard v. Banton, 264
U.S. 140 (1924); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). Mattox would meet any
of the tests set forth in these cases, except perhaps Tyson & Brother and Packard, which
appear to limit the irreparable injury doctrine to property cases. The similarity of the
injunction tests to the exceptions to the exhaustion rule of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958)
is striking.
The civil provisions of the original civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), providing
for equitable relief from deprivations of federal rights under color of state law, have en-
gendered some cases strikingly similar to the injunction cases cited above. See Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (injunction against deprivation of free speech
already held unconstitutional denied) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) (In-
junction against use of evidence secured by illegal search and seizure denied) ; Snowden
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11-12, 16-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, citing Royall), 17
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (1944) (isolated illegal behavior of state official not denial of
equal protection; therefore 14th amendment is not violated until such behavior becomes
"state action" by being approved by a state court; injunction denied) ; Cooper v. Hutchin-
son, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950), noted in 60 YALE L.J. 720 (1951) (injunction refused
"at least until it has become apparent that state procedure cannot avert irreparable harm
to these appellants." Id. at 124). See also Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies as Pre-
requisite to Invoking Jurisdiction of Federal Court Under Civil Rights Acts, 14 WAsu. &
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The author argued that Mattox did have a constitutional right not to be
lynched - or, at least, a right to be protected against lynching.8 2 The author
maintained, however, that the mere probability of an unfair trial would not be
an irreparable injury, since any errors of constitutional dimension could be
appealed, and a petitioner who could show only such a danger should be left
to his remedies in the demanding state8 3 The Note argued that the Supreme
Court cases expanding habeas corpus to include a broader and deeper inquiry
into the substance - as opposed to the form - of detention "suggest a char-
acterization of habeas corpus jurisdiction which would seem to support the
Mattox decision.""s
2. Johnson v. Dye
85
The Mattox decision lay virtually dormant for five years 80 until the Third
Circuit infused the doctrine with new life in the landmark decision of John-
son v. Dye. The petitioner, Johnson, had been convicted in Georgia for murder,
sentenced to life imprisonment, and confined on a chain gang. Within a few
months he escaped, along with 175 others, and went to Pennsylvania where
he was arrested and held pending extradition on an executive warrant issued
by the Governor.87 Johnson brought habeas corpus in a Pennsylvania court,
where he alleged that his conviction was void and that he had been cruelly
treated while on the chain gang. The trial court heard Johnson's evidence,
which was uncorroborated, and dismissed the petition for failure to meet the
requisite burden of proof. On appeal, the superior court affirmed.Ps Although
LEE L. REv. 266 (1957); 1 EmERsoN & HABER, POLITICAL AwD CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UN=TED STATEs 88 (2d ed. 1958).
82. Note, Scope of a Habeas Corpus Hearing on Interstate Rendition of Crinnals,
supra note 81, at 363-64.
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 362. Another author thought the Mattox decision's reading of Marbles v.
Creecy as establishing a rebuttable presumption was correct, but argued that only rarely
- as in Mattox, where Georgia inadvertently corroborated the petitioner's case by seek-
ing to disqualify the trial judge - will a petitioner be able to overcome the presumption
by providing anything more than a basis for speculation. Note, 17 TEM ,r" LQ. 469
(1943). Cf. In re Dukes, 26 N.J. Super. 173, 97 A.2d 507, petition for cerlifcation denied,
13 N.J. 293, 99 A.2d 452 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 914 (1954), discussed in note 178
infra.
85. 175 F2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curia:, 338 U.S. 864, rehearing denied, 338
U.S. 896 (1949).
86. The only significant cases were Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Thomas, 50
Pa. D.&C. 626 (C.P. 1944) (same result as Mattox on nearly identical facts) ; and People
ex rel. Reid v. Warden, 63 N.Y.S2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (even were Mfattox rule proper,
petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof). Reid was the first petitioner whose extra-
dition was sought not to put him to his trial, but to return him to confinement under a
sentence. The case also involved the first allegations of cruel and unusual punishment
made to a court as grounds for relief from e-tradition.
87. The facts of his case are found in Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Dye, 71 F.
Supp. 262 (W.D.Pa. 1947) ; and Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949).
88. Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Dye, 159 Pa. Super. 542, 49 A2d 195 (1946).
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Johnson does not seem to have alleged danger of future ill-treatment,8 0 which
had been the gravamen of Mattox' complaint, the implication of the superior
court's opinion is that had he made out his claims of past deprivation-
denial of due process at trial and cruel and unusual punishment on the
chain gang - he could have been released. The case is the first to suggest
that past deprivations of this kind could be grounds for release on extradition
habeas corpus.90 Johnson did not seek review of the adverse decision.
Johnson's next move was to bring habeas corpus in a federal district court.
This time his case was better presented; the American Civil Liberties Union,
considering the proceedings a test case, gave his attorney assistance. 1 Johnson
made the same allegations respecting past deprivations, and added a new al-
legation: if returned, he would be subjected to further cruel and unusual
punishment and to the danger of mob violence and risk of death. Johnson
presented a wealth of evidence,0 2 but no testimony was offered on behalf of
Georgia. The district court found that there was evidence Johnson had been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but held that this did not establish
custody in violation of* the Constitution since the eighth amendment is in-
applicable to the states. It also held that there was no evidence in support of
Johnson's allegations concerning his trial, and that his allegations of prospec-
tive cruel treatment and of danger of mob violence and death were not sus-
tained by credible evidence. The writ was discharged without prejudice to
Johnson's right to pursue other remedies in the Pennsylvania courts or to
apply for habeas corpus upon his return to Georgia.03
Johnson appealed to the Third Circuit, which heard the case en banc. That
court unanimously reversed the lower court's holding that the principle of the
eighth amendment is inapplicable to the states. 4 The court maintained that
89. But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 2-3, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864
(1949), where it is asserted that Johnson's petition for state habeas corpus also alleged
danger to his life if he were returned.
90. Only one previous case seems to have turned on past deprivations (although In
Reid, scpra note 86, such allegations were made). See Hale v. Crawford, 65 F2d 739
(1st Cir. 1933), reversing an order of release which had been granted because the indict-
ment on which the demand was made had been returned by a grand jury from which
Negroes were concededly excluded. For discussion of the case see Comment, Race Dis-
crimination and Interstate Rendition - The Crawford Case, 43 YALE L.J. 444 (1934).
91. See Petition for Rehearing, pp. 4-5, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
92. See Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949).
93. Johnson v. Dye, 71 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1947). The dismissal "without preju-
dice" was unnecessary, of course, since res judicata does not apply to habeaq corpus pro-
ceedings. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
94. The validity of this holding will be assumed throughout this Comment. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), makes it clear that the court's position was correct.
For an ingenious argument that protection against cruel and unusual punishment of the
unauthorized sort involved in Johnson v. Dye is an "anomalous type of due process" since
it is neither procedural nor substantive, see Note, The Case of the Fugitive from the Chain
Gang, 2 STAr. L. REV. 174, 175-76 (1949). Georgia conceded that the fourteenth amend-
ment precludes the states from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. See Brief of State
of Georgia as Amicus Curiae, p. 10, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
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the court below had found that Johnson had been subjected to cruel and un-
usual punishment, but held that in any case an appeal from a denial of habeas
corpus is technically de novo and that
no other conclusion would be possible in view of the known facts concern-
ing the workings of the Georgia penal system at the time of the petitioner's
sentence and in consideration of the circumstance that the State of Georgia
offered no testimony whatsoever in contradiction to that given by Johnson
and his witnessY5
Without passing on Johnson's allegations as to the ftturc treatment he would
suffer if returned, the court held that
the obligation of a State to treat its convicts with decency and humanity
is an absolute one and a federal court will not overlook a breach of that
duty .... [Because Georgia] has failed signally in its duty as one of the
sovereign States of the United States to treat a convict with decency and
humanity... [Johnson must be released].90
Thus the court affirmed two propostions: that past cruel and unusual punish-
ment is ground for release on habeas corpus, 97 and that release can appro-
priately be ordered by a court of the asylum state even in the absence of a
finding that petitioner could not secure adequate relief in the courts of the
demanding state.
Judge O'Connell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with
the first proposition. He thought that past cruel treatment should not be
ground for release. He argued, however, that despite the drawbacks of loosing
95. 175 F2d at 255-56. Of the cruelties it held Johnson had shown, the court would
only say:
We shall not set out in this opinion the revolting barbarities which Johnson
and his witnesses state were habitually perpetrated as standard chain gang practice.
To perpetrate these atrocities in an opinion is to be unfair to the American scene
as a whole and to reflect little credit on this generation for posterity. It is enough
to state that leg-irons and most frequent beatings were among the "minor" constant
cruelties.
rd. it 256 n.12.
96. Id. at 256.
97. Perhaps because of the posture of the case, the court did not consider relief less
than release - e.g., remand to the prison authorities on the condition that petitioner be
properly treated - which might have been appropriate if the case had not arisen in an
extradition context But cf. notes 226-33 infra and accompanying text for the possibilities
of such relief even in the extradition context See, for the pros and cons of relief less
than release for cruel and unusual punishment not authorized by statute or sentence, Note,
The Case of the Fugitive from the Chain Gang, 2 STAx. L. REv. 174, 176-78 (1949)
(relief less than release appropriate); Horowitz & Steinberg, The Fourclenth Amend-
ment - Its Newly Recognized Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas Corpus in Extradition,
23 So. CAur L. REv. 441, 453 (1950) (when cruelty infects the penal system of a state
it must be considered implicit in a sentence of imprisonment in that state, hence full re-
lease is appropriate). This issue of the relief appropriate for cruel and unusual punishment
will not be considered in this Comment See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text for
discussion of the development of the availability of relief other than release on habeas
corpus.
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a convicted murderer on the citizenry of an asylum state, it would be better to
let Johnson go free than to leave him unprotected against future cruel and
unusual punishment; he thought it was clear that the federal courts have the
power on habeas corpus to protect petitioners in that way. If Georgia would
now treat Johnson properly, he should be returned. Judge O'Connell would
have remanded for findings by the district court on the likelihood of future
treatment of the sort Johnson had already endured. It is not entirely clear
whether he would also have disagreed with the second proposition; the logic
of his argument suggests, however, that even had he accepted the court's hold-
ing that past systematic cruel and unusual punishment is grounds for relief,
he would nonetheless have maintained that unless the unavailability of Georgia
relief could be shown, Johnson should be left to his Georgia remedies. That is,
he seems to have accepted the postion that what justifies a broad-scope inquiry
on extradition habeas corpus is the prospect of an irreparable deprivation of
constitutional right.98
There was a final issue in the case - one which the district court had not
even mentioned - on which the court of appeals was unanimous: that ex-
haustion of the remedies in the asylum state's courts is not a prerequisite to
federal extradition habeas corpus, even when a petitioner has initially sought
state habeas corpus. There was precedent for this holding, though the recent
decisions were in conflict.99
Pennsylvania sought certiorari to the decision, alleging that the Third Cir-
cuit had erred in holding the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable to extradition
habeas corpus. Pennsylvania argued that Johnson should have been required
to pursue his Pennsylvania remedies to a final conclusion before seeking fed-
98. Most of the law review commentary on Johnson v. Dye that accepted the per-
missibility of the broad scope inquiry, considered Judge O'Connell's limitation of relief
to prospective injuries the better view. See 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 234 (1950) ; Note, 23 So. CAL.
L. Rzv. 86 (1949) ; Horowitz & Steinberg, supra note 97 at 455-56; Note, The Case of
the Fugitive From the Chain Gang, 2 STA'. L. REv. 174, 182-83 (1949); Comment, The
Linits of Constitutional Inquiry on Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 21 U.Cn. L.
REv. 735, 751-52 (1954). Cf. Note, Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 47 CoLum. L,
REv. 470, 475-76 (1947) ; Note, Scope of a Habeas Corpus Hearing on Interstate Extra-
dition of Crinials, 53 YALE L.J. 359 (1944). But cf. Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel
Pioshmnent, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271 (1950) and Note, Habeas Corpus hn Extradition Pro-
ceedings, 1 DUKE L.J. 188 (1951) for positions closer to that of the majority in Johnson
v. Dye.
For commentary disapproving the Third Circuit's action altogether, see deGraffenried,
The Law of Extradition, 2 ALA. L. Rnv. 207 (1949); Comment, Interstate Rendition, I
J. PuB. L. 463 (1952).
99. Not until 1942 had any circuit applied the exhaustion doctrine to extradition cases,
Both the Third and Seventh Circuits had allowed petitioners to change court systems in
mid-stream. The Third Circuit had inconsistent holdings as precedent. See note 49 supra
and accompanying text. Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338




eral relief. °00 Georgia filed an amicus brief which made it absolutely plain that
Georgia took a quite different view of the issue in the case:
The legal position of the State of Georgia differs from that of the peti-
tioner upon the question of application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies in habeas corpus cases arising from extradition proceed-
ings.' ol
Georgia disagreed with Pennsylvania's position that only the asylum state's
remedies need be exhausted and argued that the exhaustion of state remedies
rule as applied to extradition habeas corpus requires exhaustion of the de-
manding state's remedies. Thus, a federal court in the asylum state should be
precluded from entertaining a broad-scope inquiry. The essence of the fed-
eralism rationale for the exhaustion doctrine - the concept that a state court
should have the first opportunity to adjudicate a claim arising out of its
criminal process - necessitates that Georgia's remedies be exhausted before
any federal court, in asylum or demanding state, adjudicates claims such as
Johnson presented. Only if the exceptions to the rule - lack of Georgia reme-
dies, or circumstances rendering them ineffective - were present would federal
intervention have been justified, but the Third Circuit had expressly declined
to make such findings.' 02
On the exhaustion issue alone, then, the Supreme Court was presented with
five possible decisions, assuming it granted certiorari: (1) it could affirm,
agreeing that the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable to extradition habeas
corpus; (2) it could reverse on the ground that although the exhaustion rule
does not apply in full force to extradition habeas corpus, a petitioner is pre-
cluded from starting in a state court and changing in mid-stream to the fed-
eral courts; (3) it could reverse on the ground that the exhaustion rule is
applicable and requires the exhaustion of the asyhum state's remedies (Penn-
sylvania's position) ; (4) it could reverse on the ground that the exhaustion
rule is applicable and requires the exhaustion of the demnanding state's reme-
dies (Georgia's position) ; (5) it could reverse on the ground that the ex-
100. Petition, for Writ of Certiorari, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
101. Brief of State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, Dye v. Johnson, 33S U.S. 864
(1949).
102. Brief of State of Georgia, supra note 101, at 8-10, 15. Georgia raised other lesser
objections: that the Third Circuit denied Georgia's motion to intervene and Pennsylvania's
motion to file a petition for rehearing out of time, despite Georgia's claim that it had
failed to receive the invitation to appear in the federal court proceedings (id. at 6, 13) ;
that the evidence did not support the Third Circuit's findings of fact (id. at 10-14) ; that
the Third Circuit in effect presumed against Georgia simply because it failed to appear,
and that it is most unreasonable to force Georgia to appear all over the country to avoid
such presumptions (id. at 13, 15). Georgia was most offended by the decision:
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, in effect, holds that the remedy available
at the hands of the judicial system of Georgia is worthless. Thus the Court of Ap-
peals not only holds that the penal system of Georgia permits the perpetration of
crimes upon its prisoners; it holds, in effect, that the judiciary of Georgia provide
no relief for such crimes.
Id. at 15.
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haustion rule is applicable and requires the exhaustion of both the asylum
and demanding states' remedies.
10 3
Since Johnson's attorneys conceived of the proceedings as a test case and
therefore desired a Supreme Court determination of the issues, they decided
not to file a brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. 104
The Court granted certiorari,10 5 and reversed the decision below:
Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judg-
ment is reversed. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114. MR. JUSTIcE DOUGLAS
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.1°0
The case so cryptically cited by the Court, Ex parte Hawk, had culminated the
development of the exhaustion rule from a discretionary into a mandatory
one;107 it had nothing to do with extradition habeas corpus. The Court's de-
cision was a masterpiece of ambiguity; but 32 words in length, it was sus-
103. These alternatives are stated pristinely to emphasize the absurdity of the Court's
decision. The Court could also have found the exhaustion rule inapplicable, but designed
a rule of comity requiring the same result as any of options (2)-(5), with or without
exceptions; or it could have accepted (1) basically, but reversed for failure to use a rem-
edy other than release (see notes 226-33 infra and accompanying text); or it could
have basically accepted (1) but reversed for failure to apply the proper test (e.g. the
prospective injury test of Judge O'Connell). The outcomes available to the Court were
almost infinitely varied.
104. Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2, 4-5, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 896 (1949).
105. In considering whether the case was an appropriate one for the Court to grant
certiorari - whether the legal problems involved were ripe for Supreme Court adjudica-
tion - two district court decisions rendered in the interim between the Third Circuit's
action, and the Court's reversal, should be mentioned. They indicate that the only trial
judge who had had an opportunity to apply the Third Circuit doctrine was construing
it quite narrowly - that no radical disruption of the extradition process would have
resulted from a postponement of Supreme Court action. In Ex parte Marshall, 85 F.Supp.
771 (D.N.J. 1949), the petitioner relied upon the Third Circuit rule in seeking relief on
the basis of past cruel and unusual punishment; the district judge denied relief, distinguish-
ing Johnson v. Dye on the ground that there was no reason to suppose that the prison
where Marshall was being incarcerated was not taking steps to comply with its con-
stitutional obligations. The same judge, in Harper v. Wall, 85 F.Supp, 783 (D.NJ. 1949),
released the petitioner, distinguishing Ex parte Marshall on the ground that in that case
there was reason to believe that the conditions complained of had been corrected, whereas
here the petitioner's allegations of danger of future ill-treatment carried conviction. The
district judge seems to have been limiting the Third Circuit's doctrine to fulare depriva-
tions; he seems to have come close to treating Judge O'Connell's position as the rule of
Johnson z,. Dye.
Perversely enough, the Third Circuit itself later indicated in dictum that its decision
in Johnson v. Dye rested upon proof of past deprivations, and that allegations of future
irreparable injury are insufficient to warrant relief. United States ex rel. Mills v. Relng,
191 F.2d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 1951). Petitioner was held as a fugitive felon under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1073 (1958), and brought habeas corpus to avoid removal for trial to the Northern
District of Alabama, whence he had fled while under indictment for a state offense. The
court distinguished Johnson v. Dye primarily on the ground that the petitioner was being
removed into federal custody.
106. Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 896 (1949).
107. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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ceptible of either of four interpretations - options (2), (3), (4), or (5) dis-
cussed above. Since the major alternatives had been squarely presented to the
Court, the ambiguity of its opinion should have been patent. The opinion was
one which Mr. Justice Frankfurter might have characterized as an example of
Supreme Court adjudication at its worst: an important case decided basically
ex parte, with little and totally inadequate briefing,108 no oral argument, and
no apparent effort by the Court to think about what it was doing.1°  Neither
the briefs nor the Court considered the problem in the context of habeas cor-
pus doctrine generally, nor of extradition habeas corpus doctrine in particular.
In this way a unanimous Third Circuit, sitting cn banc, was reversed. 10
The fact that the Court felt that the exhaustion doctrine of Ex pare Hawk
called for reversal - that the case was not decided on the theory that the scope
of extradition habeas corpus is absolutely limited to the traditional narrow
inquiry - might be significant. It could indicate that the exceptions to the
exhaustion rule are applicable, that if Johnson had proved the non-availability
or ineffectiveness of his remedies in Pennsylvania or in Georgia the Third
Circuit's decision would have been upheld. And if it indicated that, it might
also mean that the Supreme Court had accepted the basic premise of the broad-
scope inquiry in extradition habeas corpus: that the realities behind the forms
of extradition may be considered. The Court could be taken, in short, to have
endorsed the Mattox rule. The difficulty of attributing this much significance
to the Court's action is that one can feel quite confident the Court w%,as not
aware of the implication that might be drawn from its citation of Ex pare
Hawk. The briefs before the Court had dealt with the case as though exhaus-
tion alone were involved. On the other hand, the Court's opinion, based solely
on the exhaustion doctrine, cannot be taken to foreclose the broad-scope inquiry
of the Mattox case.
Another important problem is that of deciding which remedies the Court
felt Johnson had failed to exhaust. It would appear that the Court did not
108. Georgia's brief was acceptable as far as it went. Pennsylvania's should be a
source of shame to the Commonwealth: its argument was unintelligent, based upon
misstatements of fact [e.g., it alleged that the Third Circuit held the exhaustion rule
inapplicable whenever constitutional guarantees are involved - a patent absurdity in
any case, since habeas corpus itself only lies in such a situation - see Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, p. 8, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949)] and miscitations of cases that
were, to be charitable, uncraftsmanlike. An opposing brief did not exist, of course.
109. For Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views on Supreme Court adjudication at its best
basically the opposite of all that happened in Dye v. Johnson - see Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46, 59-60 (1947) (concurring opinion). For law review commentary on the
decision, uniformly critical, see Frank, The United Slates Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18
U.CHL L. REv. 1, 39-40 (1950); Note, Prisoner?' Remedies for MAistreatment, 59 YAtL
L.J. 800, 803 (1950); Note, The Case of the Fugitive from the Chain Gang, 2 STAn. L.
Rxv. 174, 183 (1949); President's Page, 2 STAir. L. Rnv. 255 (1950).
110. The Court did not do the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits the courtesy of citing
their decisions which had held the exhaustion rule applicable in forms (2) and (3) ; nor
were the decisions of the Third and Seventh Circuits holding the exhaustion rule inap-
plicable cited. See note 49 supra.
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adopt option (4), the position of Georgia, since it did not remand for findings
as to the availability or effectiveness of Georgia remedies.'11 A fortiori, option
(5) must be rejected as a plausible construction of the Court's opinion.112
Thus, it seems that either option (2) or option (3) is the best interpretation
of the opinion. For Johnson himself, the difference between (2) and (3) was
immaterial; since he had begun in the Pennsylvania courts, either would re-
quire him to exhaust his Pennsylvania remedies. Option (3) seems the less
likely interpretation since many cases, unmentioned in the opinion, had allowed
petitioners to seek extradition habeas corpus initially in the federal courts.
The anti-mid-stream rule, option (2), thus appears to be the least implausible
interpretation. As the least significant holding of the alternatives, it is most
reconcilable with the Court's careless disposition of the case; as between it
and option (3) far fewer precedents would be overruled without citation.113
There is, moreover, no reason for opposing an anti-mid-stream rule and con-
siderations of comity between the federal and state courts of the asylum state
would seem to support it."
4
A third significant feature of the opinion is that Ex parte Hawk, rather
than 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which had codified the exhaustion rule, was cited.
Did the Court accept the view that section 2254 is inapplicable to extradition
cases? There are at least three good reasons supporting such an interpretation.
First, section 2254 itself begins, "An application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court
shall not be granted unless.. .." (emphasis added). An extraditee is, of course,
111. Judge O'Connell's concurrence specifically raised the ineffectiveness issue. Query
whether Georgia would also have to have remedies adequate to afford Johnson relicf for
the past ill-treatment he has suffered. The questions are very similar in Johnson v. Dye
since the problem was whether, from a chain gang, one can get into court at all. There
is this much difference: Georgia remedies might be available - but not until after the
chain gang officials would have had another chance to torture Johnson. Query whether
such a remedy is "effective." Cf. notes 200-04 infra and accompanying text.
112. The Court may have meant (4) or (5), but that in the extradition context no
opportunity to show the exceptions to the exhaustion rule are to be afforded. It is hard
to believe that such a cryptic opinion could have been intended to carry such a powerful
meaning.
113. See note 49 supra.
114. See note 115 infra for an additional justification for option (2) and cf. notes 219-
21 infra. See Note, Prisoners" Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALP L.J. 800, 803 (1950),
for a tentative suggestion to the same effect as the construction of the Supreme Court's
decision proposed herein. One feature of the case which cuts against the theory that the
Supreme Court adopted either (2) or (3) is the fact that, as the exhaustion doctrine stood
in 1949, Johnson perhaps had adequately exhausted Pennsylvania's remedies. Appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not lie as of right, and the scope of review was in any
case very narrow. A federal court could well have concluded that such an appeal would have
been nearly futile. Failure to seek certiorari, under the rule of Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672
(1948), was not an absolute requisite of exhaustion, Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950),




in custody pursuant to a warrant issued by the exccutiivc authority of the
asylum state." 5 Second, the inapplicability of section 2254 which appears on
its face is not fortuitous: Congress seems to have intended that custody pur-
suant to executive warrants not be covered.'1 0 Third, the federal courts are
explicitly given habeas corpus jurisdiction of prisoners "in custody under or
by color of the authority of the United States.""' 7 Since, as we have seen, it is
the extradition clause and the implementing federal statute which constitute
the authority of the executive of an asylum state to issue a w-arrant for the
arrest of a fugitive, an extraditee is clearly in custody "under or by color of
the authority of" the federal government."18 The exhaustion rule, and its cul-
mination in section 2254, was designed to cope with the problems arising from
the extension of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners," 0 not
to cut into the basic habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts over
prisoners incarcerated by authority of federal law.'2 If, then, section 2254 is
inapplicable to extradition proceedings, the federal courts are free to fashion
a rule of abstention, based upon the same principles as the exhaustion rule,
which will meet the peculiar circumstances of extradition habeas corpus. 12 To
characterize the rule of abstention which should apply in extradition cases
simply as "exhaustion" is misleading since it tends to obscure the important
differences between ordinary habeas corpus and extradition habeas corpus.
The Court's failure to appreciate the distinctive nature of extradition habeas
corpus is at least partly responsible for the ambiguity of its opinion in Johnson
v. Dye. The problem should be approached directly in terms of what the
proper scope of inquiry should be, what should constitute adequate grounds
for relief, and what relief should be on extradition habeas corpus.
115. One might justify option (2) in the Johnson case - the anti-midstream-change
rule - on the ground that once a petitioner has been refused release on habeas corpus
by a state court he is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court within § 2254:
i.e., the judgment that he is not entitled to release.
116. The House draft of § 2254 included executive warrants, but they were dropped
at Conference. See Note, Prisoners' Remcdies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J. 800, 802
n.11 (1950).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (1) (1958).
118. See notes 45-47 .supra and accompanying text.
119. See text accompanying notes 24-35 supra.
120. See note 47 supra.
121. Even were § 2254 deemed applicable to the extradition habeas corpus situation,
and even were it interpreted to require exhaustion of the demanding state's remedies, when
irreparable deprivations of constitutional rights are threatened in an extradition proceed-
ing, the "ineffective" remedy exception to § 2254 is clearly relevant. And even without
that exception, the courts have held that § 2254 codifies a rule of comity - a principle
of the proper exercise of power - not a rule of jurisdiction. See Fay v. Noin, 372 U.S.
391, 419-20 (1963) ; United States cx rel Cuomo v. Fay, 257 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 935 (1959). As a principle of the proper exercise of power, it does
not necessarily override competing principles - as, here, the principle that constitutional
rights be afforded effective protection. Cf. Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts
to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YAix L.J. 1169-72 (1933).
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3. The Aftermath of Johnson v. Dye in the Federal Courts
Johnson v. Dye was immediately followed by a rash of similar cases,12  and
within three years five other circuits were faced with the task of deciding
what the Supreme Court's disposition of the case should be taken to mean and
whether to follow the lead of the Third Circuit by allowing a broad scope of
inquiry on extradition habeas corpus.
The Second Circuit faced this problem in United States ex rel. Jackson v.
Ruthazer (1950).123 Interpreting the Supreme Court's reversal in Johnson v.
Dye to require exhaustion of remedies in the asylum state only, the court held
that Jackson had adequately exhausted his New York remedies. It disposed of
the case on the ground that Jackson had already received a full and fair hearing
on the merits of his claim from the New York courts, which had decided that
his allegations were not believable.124 Thus the court did not reach the ultimate
question whether, assuming Jackson's allegations had been proved, the Third
Circuit's doctrine was correct.
Next the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was confronted with
the problem. In Johnson v. Matthews (1950) 125 the petitioner had been or-
dered returned to Georgia for trial. He sought habeas corpus in the district
court, alleging that he had been subjected to brutal treatment, endangering his
life, while held pending trial in Georgia; that he would suffer more of the
same if returned; and that he might never be brought to trial nor have an
opportunity to seek relief from the state and federal courts in Georgia. The
district court dismissed the writ, refusing to hear evidence on petitioner's
allegations of past and future treatment in the demanding state. On appeal,
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, judge Bazelon dissenting. The court
held that extradition habeas corpus tests only the validity of detention in the
asylum state - not the validity of past or prospective detention in the de-
manding state - and hence is limited to the traditional narrow-scope inquiry.
The court took the Supreme Court's citation of Ex parte Hawk in Johnson v.
Dye to mean that the remedies of a demanding state must be exhausted as to
claims arising out of custody in that state.120 But without discussing the ex-
122. Johnson himself went back to the Pennsylvania courts, was denied relief by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and did not seek certiorari. He returned to the District Court
which, interpreting the Supreme Court's reversal in Johnson v. Dye to require exlaus-
tion of the asylum state's remedies, held that Johnson had failed to exhaust his Pennsyl-
vania remedies because he had not sought certiorari. He sought and was denied certiorari,
reopened his case in the district court, which heard evidence on the merits, but he died
in 1950 before a decision was rendered. See Johnson v. Dye, 94 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Penn.
1950); Pennsylvania ex rel. Johnson v. Dye, 341 U.S. 911 (1951) (certiorari denied,
Douglas, J., dissenting); Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae p. 3. n.3,
Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
123. 181 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 980 (1950).
124. People ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 90 N.Y.S.2d 205, 196 Misc. 34 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd inee., 93 N.Y.S.2d 729, 276 App. Div. 832 (1949), motion for leave to appeal denied,
300 N.Y. 762, 90 N.E.2d 69 (1950).
125. 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
126. 182 F.2d at 683 n.22.
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ceptions to the exhaustion rule - the absence or ineffectiveness of state reme-
dies - the court held that petitioner could not even be allowed to show that
he would be unable to get into court in Georgia.L The Court maintained that
it is the Supreme Court which has authority over Georgia's state and federal
courts, not the courts of another jurisdiction.128 Since petitioner did not allege
that the Georgia courts, state or federal, would be the cause of his inability to
get relief if returned, the relevance of this point is unclear; the court could
hardly have believed that the Supreme Court is so omnipotent it can protect
the constitutional rights of petitioners even though they can never bring their
plight to the Court's attention. The court assumed as fact precisely what
petitioner sought to challenge, positing the availability and effectiveness of
Georgia remedies in order to deny the need for relief in the District of Colum-
bia. Extradition, the court said, is merely procedural; it does not affect sub-
stantive constitutional rights.
1 29
judge Bazelon delivered a scathing dissent:
The obvious importance of the federal system, and the desire to facilitate
its workings, should not obscure the fact that action in pursuance of one
constitutional power may run afoul of another. Unless the Constitution
is read as a whole, there is grave danger that the extradition process will
be executed in unduly mechanistic fashion and in complete disregard of
the fundamental considerations of humanity and decency which are re-
flected in the Bill of Rights. Certainly, the interest of the various govern-
ments of our federal system in the orderly workings of the extradition
machinery is a factor of moment. And in such interest, it may ordinarily
be desirable to limit the inquiry on habeas corpus to the three or four
traditional questions posed in such cases. But where one constitutional
purpose must be weighed against another - one promoting efficiency and
comity between states, the other protecting fundamental rights of the in-
dividual against state infringement - our system of government will be
better served by assessing greater weight to the latter. Serious doubt con-
cerning the effectiveness of future guarantees of such fundamental rights
ought not to be resolved -by speculation or presumption that somehow,
somewhere, but not here, some court will be able to prevent a repetition
of past abuses.130
Under the majority's view, he pointed out, even if petitioner were able to
show he would never get into a Georgia court, he could not be given a hear-
127. In support of this position the court made a number of curiously irrelevant argu-
ments. The court thought the following is a reductio ad absurdunz: a fugitive has no
greater right than an incarcerated person who does not escape; therefore petitioner must
seek the same Georgia remedies that such a person would have to pursue; if petitioner's
argument as to the practical impossibility of securing relief in Georgia were accepted, it
would follow that these non-escapees also cannot get into court, therefore cannot bring
habeas corpus, and are wholly without protection. Id. at 682. It is obscure why the court
thought this argument a reductio and why it thought the conclusion an absurdum.
128. Id. at 681.
129. Id. at 682. The court also claimed that the rule of Johnsonz t Dye would plunge
law enforcement into "chaos" (id. at 684), encourage fabricated stories of brutality (id. at
683), and "nullify" the extradition clause (id. at 680).
130. Id. at 685.
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ing on habeas corpus. Allowing petitioner to attempt to rebut the presumption
that the Georgia courts would be available to him upon his return would not
be disrespectful to the Georgia courts, but would merely be taking into account
the fact that those courts might never have an opportunity to deal with the
case. The proper disposition of the case would be that proposed by judge
O'Connell in Johnson v. Dye: allow a hearing on the merits of petitioner's
allegations, insofar as they relate to the incapacity of the courts of Georgia to
protect petitioner from prospective cruel treatment. 131 Petitioner sought, and
was denied, certiorari.
132
In Davis v. O'Connell (1950) 133 the Eighth Circuit considered a case pre-
senting issues substantially the same as those in Johnson v. Matthws, and
reacted in the same way. The court particularly emphasized that the validity
of past or prospective detention in the demanding state is beyond the jfuris-
diction of a federal court in the asylum state.
134
In Ross v. Middlebrooks (1951) 185 petitioner sought to avoid extradition
from California to Georgia, on the ground that his sentence to a chain gang
was void because inherently a cruel and unusual punishment. He alleged he
would be unable to present his claim in the courts of Georgia. After exhaust-
ing his California remedies, he sought habeas corpus in a federal district court,
which ordered his release, agreeing with his contention that the assignment to
a Georgia chain gang constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
131. Part of petitioner's claim was that he would be held indefinitely pending trial.
Assuming he were properly treated in other respects, query whether the logic of Judge
Bazelon's opinion would not require release nonetheless by the asylum court, if petitioner
could show he would not be able to secure a hearing on habeas corpus if returned,
132. Johnson v. Matthews, 340 U.S. 838 (1950). The American Civil Liberties Union
represented petitioner. The question it saw presented was whether the courts below should
have afforded petitioner a hearing on his claims of constitutional deprivations in Georgia.
It was urged- that the Circuit Court below had incorrectly interpreted the reversal of
Johnson v. Dye, had construed the limits of extradition habeas corpus so narrowly that
extradition would be required even when the result would be to defeat fundamental
constitutional rights, and had failed to balance clashing constitutional provisions. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Johnson v. Matthews, 340 U.S. 828 (1950). The respondent
alleged that petitioner had admitted the availability of the Georgia courts, and that he
vould have access to them, before the District Court - and that this admission was the
basis of the dismissal; that while Johnson v. Dye was inconsistent "in principle," it was
distinguishable on its facts because there, unlike here, there were "exceptional circum-
stances" justifying a failure to exhaust the demanding state's remedies. Memorandum
of Respondent, Johnson v. Matthews, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
133. 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950).
134. This statement was apparently by way of dictum. The district court had dis-
missed the petition for want of jurisdiction on, grounds petitioner had failed to exhaust
his asylum state remedies. Georgia - the demanding state - had intervened and urged
dismissal on grounds the petitioner sought to attack Georgia proceedings collaterally, and
had failed to exhaust his Georgia remedies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground
petitioner had failed io exhaust the asylum state's remedies, but went on to argue that the
inquiry urged by the petitioner was beyond the jurisdiction of a court in the asylum state.
135. Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev/d sub ,nom.
Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951).
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of the fourteenth amendment.136 As justification for imputing the impermissi-
bility of the Georgia detention to the detention in California, the court adopted
a "state action" rationale. Since California could not be compelled to extradite
petitioner, its action in doing so was "state action"; and since petitioner would
be returned to unconstitutional punishment with very little likelihood of relief
in the Georgia courts, the participation of California in the proceedings would
be impermissible "state action" in furtherance of a deprivation of petitioner's
constitutional rights. Neither the extradition clause nor the implementing stat-
ute, the court said, can be used to negate another constitutional provision.13
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, petitioner's counsel conceded that petitioner
would be able to get a hearing in the courts of Georgia; reversing on the basis
of this concession the court held that the exhaustion rule requires that Georgia's
courts be afforded the first opportunity to consider the serious questions pre-
sented by petitioner's allegations.138
The next case, which arose in the Sixth Circuit, was Voodall v. Sweeney
(1952), 139 which culminated in a critical Supreme Court decision. Up to this
point three circuits had entertained allegations of misconduct by the demanding
state. One (the Third, Johnson v. Dye) had held past cruel and unusual
punishment grounds for relief. Two had been presented with claims of pro-
spective ill-treatment and had not protested their lack of competence; one (the
Second, Ruthazer) had declined to reach the merits, the other (the Ninth,
Middlebrooks) had relied on a concession that the demanding state's courts
would be available. Two circuits (the District of Columbia, Johnson v. Mat-
thews, and the Eighth, Davis v. O'Connell) and a district court in a third
(the First)' 40 had distinctly held that a petitioner could not be heard on any
claim as to misconduct by the demanding state.
IV. THE (NEARLY) FATAL BLOW: SWEENEY V. WOODAL 14 1
1. The Sweeney Case
The Sweeney case involved two escapees from an Alabama chain gang,
Quillian and Woodall, who sought to avoid extradition from Ohio. The ale-
136. 88 F. Supp. at 948, 951-52.
137. Id. at 953-54. The central arguments used by the District Court - that when
cruelty infects a state's penal system it can be imputed to the sentences imposed, thus
rendering them void; and that extradition to impermissible punishment is unconstitutional
"state action" - were both derived from Horowitz & Steinberg, The Fourleenth Amend-
,':ent - Its Newly Recognized Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas Corpus in Extradition,
23 So. CAL. L. Rsv. 441 (1950).
138. See also Gerrish v. New Hampshire, 97 F. Supp. 527 (D. Maine 1951) for con-
sideration of the issues raised in Johnson v. Dye by a court in the First Circuit. Petitioner
alleged that cruel and unusual punishment (use of drugs and confinement incommunicado
in a mental hospital) was used by officials of the demanding state to prevent him from
seeking relief in its courts. Johnson v. Matthews was followed.
139. 194 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.), rezId, 344 U.S. 86, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 916 (1952).
140. See note 138 supra.
141. 344 U.S. 86, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 916 (1952), reversing, 194 F.2d 542 (6th
Cir. 1952).
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gations they made before the Ohio courts are unclear; the Ohio Court of
Appeals characterized their claim as one that Alabama "is violating... [their)
Constitutional rights." The court held that the petitioners could make such
a claim only in the courts of the demanding state. The court reasoned that the
traditional principle that on pre-trial extradition the courts of the asylum state
will not consider the validity of the charge against the extraditee requires the
analogous principle that on post-conviction extradition the courts of the asylum
state will not consider the validity of the conviction and detention in the de-
manding state. 142 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed petitioners' appeal,
"for the reason that no debatable constitutional issue is involved." 143 The
petitioners unsuccessfully sought certiorari to the Supreme Court.
144
Quillian and Woodall next sought relief in the federal courts. The district
court, after hearing oral argument but refusing to hear proffered evidence
concerning prison treatment in Alabama, dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus on the basis of Johnson v. Matthews.145 Woodall pursued his relief to
the Sixth Circuit. That court, without opinion, ordered the dismissal by the
district court set aside and the cause remanded for the taking of evidence on
the merits.146
Ohio immediately sought certiorari, pointing to the ambiguity of the Court's
disposition of Johnson v. Dye and the conflict among the circuits on the proper
interpretation of that case. The Court agreed to hear the case. In its brief, Ohio
argued that issues arising out of custody in Alabama "do not come within the
jurisdiction of a state or federal court of another state to which ... [a] fugi-
tive has fled."'1 47 The only issue in the case, Ohio urged, was one of jurisdic-
tion, and the district court had properly decided it. Woodall could get relief in
Alabama's courts; Alabama was not represented, nor did it have funds to
provide for representation in suits such as this; the Ohio state and federal
courts cannot presume, on the basis of petitioner's "wholly unwarranted state-
ment," that he would be killed if returned to Alabama. Furthermore, Ohio
does not relish the idea of being a penal colony for other states.
148
142. In re Quilliam (sic], In re Woodall, 88 Ohio App. 202, 89 N.E.2d 493 (1949).
The court also observed that the only relief an asylum state could give would be full re-
lease, "thus in effect commuting their sentences for serious crimes of which they have bcen
found guilty." The court stated that one purpose of the extradition clause is to prevent
an asylum state from becoming, willy-nilly, a refuge for the criminals of other states.
143. Ex parte Quillian v. Sweeney, Ex parte Woodall v. Sweeney, 152 Ohio St. 368,
89 N.E.2d 494 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950). This was followed in State
ex rel. Toht v. McClure, 87 Ohio App. 520, 96 N.E.2d 308 (1950).
144. Quillian v. Sweeney, Woodall v. Sweeney, 339 U.S. 945 (1950). Mr. Justice
Douglas was of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.
145. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-7, Sweeney
v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
146. Woodall v. Sweeney, 194 F2d 542 (6th Cir.), reversed, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief for Petitioner, p. 19, Sweeney v. Wood-
all, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
148. Id. at 16-18. Ohio also argued that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision should have precluded a lower federal court from
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Georgia filed a brief as amicus curiae, stating that its interest in the case
was due to the fact that it was the demanding state in so many other similar
situations. Georgia urged the Court to clear up the ambiguity of its disposition
of Johnson v. Dye by holding that the exhaustion rule of section 2254, as
strictly construed in Darr v. Burford,4 0 precludes a broad-scope inquiry on
extradition habeas corpus.'50 The exhaustion rule, Georgia argued, when ap-
plied in an extradition case, is of far more significance than the mere principle
of forum non conveniens, although the severe inconvenience and humiliations
to which Georgia has been subjected by having to defend itself in distant forums
against all manner of charges, covering many years in varying places, make
forum non conveniens itself a strong reason in favor of the traditional narrow
scope.1'5 Exhaustion is more basic, as "it grows out of the delicate nature of
our dual sovereignty and as such 'It is a principle of right and of law and,
therefore of necessity.' "152
Woodall's brief in the Supreme Court was so appallingly bad IM that the
presentation to the Court must be deemed in effect ex parte. Though obscured
by pages of irrelevancies and illegibilities, what did come across in Woodall's
brief was the nature of the cruel treatment to which he allegedly had been and
would be subjected. If believed, the proffered testimony of Woodall and of
two other Alabama ex-prisoners whose depositions were liberally quoted in
the brief established beyond all doubt that Woodall had suffered a variety of
injecting itself into the extradition process. Id. at 18. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200
(1950) ; and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), on this problem. The year after the
Sweeney case, the Court held in Brown that the denial of certiorari to the final stage of
state court proceedings is without significance as to the power of a lower federal court
to entertain habeas corpus.
149. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
150. Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae, pp. 11-12, Sweeney v. Woodall,
344 U.S. 86 (1952).
151. Id. at 7, 13.
152. Id. at 13.
153. That it was typewritten is understandable, but the typing was so bad that sig-
nificant parts of the brief were nearly illegible. Miscitations and typing errors were ram-
pant. The brief was replete with trivial errors whose primary significance lies in their
revelation of legal illiteracy. See, e.g., in the table of contents, 'Ex. [sic] parte v. [sic]
Hawk." Brief for Respondent, Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952). The writing
was so poor, and organization so utterly lacking, that the arguments were usually almost
indiscernible. The brief abounded in statements and requests calculated to raise judicial
doubts about the petitioner's case: e.g., the Court was asked to take judicial notice of
the fact that Alabama prisons treat prisoners cruelly (id. at 40) and was told that the
sentence imposed by the Alabama courts on Woodall was "revolting, and can not even
with difficulty be conceived in our Democracy and under the American Flag." (Ibid.) In
short, Woodall's biggest handicap before the Court was the brief submitted by his attorney.
Query whether, confronted by such a brief, the Court did not have an obligation to request
an amicus brief in support of Woodall, or to order additional counsel to represent him.
The American Civil Liberties Union, which had been involved in both Johnson v. Dye
(see note 91 supra and accompanying te't) and Johnson i. Matthews (see note 132 supra)
would have been an obvious choice.
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barbaric treatments, with ever-present risk of death; that if returned he would
suffer more of the same; that however good the Alabama courts might be,
Woodall would never be able to present his grievances before them.154 As the
"question presented" the brief asked whether a federal court in an asylum
state should have heard petitioner's claims if petitioner alleged a lack of cor-
rective process in Alabama or circumstances rendering such process ineffective
- the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion rule.lm The brief also asked
this rhetorical question of the Court:
May we inquire of this Court as to what remedy is available to
Respondent to protect him from being subjected to cruel, inhuman and
barbaric treatment or the taking of his life by the jailers, guards and
prison officials of the Alabama prison if Respondent is turned over to
them. If Respondent is denied the relief he is seeking, he will be imme-
diately released to the jailers, guards and prison officials of the Alabama
Prison the very ones whom Respondent fled from, by reason of the cruel,
inhuman and barbaric treatment he received at their hands, to inflict such
punishment, as they in their judgment deem befitting to satisfy them and
their thirst for blood, even if it is the taking of the life of the Respondent.
The sad thing and the irony of it all, is that Respondent will be helpless
and be at their complete mercy.156
Read hastily and narrowly, Woodall's brief might with great difficulty be con-
strued - as the Supreme Court in fact did construe it - to allege that the
proof he intended to submit would go only to the non-availability of Alabama
remedies.'" But the proffered evidence clearly included the allegation that
notwithstanding the theoretical availability of Alabama remedies, Woodall
would in fact be unable to get into a court at all; Woodall's statement that
he would gladly seek relief in the Alabama courts if he could remain in the
custody of a TJnited States Marshal while doing so 118 seems to refute any
contention that he complained only of the non-availability of Alabama reme-
dies.
Again as in Johnson v. Dye the Supreme Court disposed of the case per
curiam, without hearing oral argument.6 9 The Court accepted the claim of the
Ohio and Georgia briefs that Woodall did not seek to show that lie would be
unable to obtain a hearing in Alabama. Assuming the availability of Alabama
relief upon Woodall's return, the Court said:
Considerations fundamental to our federal system require that the pris-
oner test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in
the courts of that State. Respondent should be required to initiate his suit
154. Brief for Respondent, Sweeney v. Woodall, pp. 3-5, 8, 10-18, 21-39, 344 U.S. 86
(1952).
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id. at 38-39.
157. See, in particular, id. at 8, where the allegation made is susceptible of construc-
tion as one claiming only that Alabama provides no remedy.
158. Id. at 39.
159. Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk, United States Supreme Court, to the YA=s
LAv JOURNAL, March 30, 1964.
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in the courts of Alabama, where all parties may be heard, where all per-
tinent testimony will be readily available and where suitable relief, if any
is necessary, may be fashioned. 160
The Court made passing reference to all the justifications for such a rule. Thus
the argument was made that just because he is an escapee, Woodall should
not have the privilege of making his claim in a court unavailable to his non-
escapee fellow Alabamans, with the additional twist that Woodall's "self-help"
should not affect the authority of the Alabama courts to determine the validity
of imprisonment in Alabama.' 61 The forum non convCnicns argument pressed
by Georgia's brief was accepted. 162 The limited scope of relief available to an
asylum court, as compared with the freedom a court in the demanding state
would have, was hinted at.163 But as the quotation above shows, the Court
bottomed its opinion in the needs of federalism. Significantly, the Court did
not seek to justify its decision in exhaustion terms; at least the Court ap-
proached the problem of the proper scope of extradition habeas corpus direct-
ly.164
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, emphasized that the Court's opinion
rested on the absence of any "suggestion" in the petition for habeas corpus
that Woodall would not have an opportunity to resort to the Alabama courts
for protection.165 With the case in that posture, he said,
We cannot assume unlawful action of the [Alabama] prison officials which
would prevent the petitioner from invoking the aid of the local courts
nor [can we] readily open the door to such a clain.... Our federal sys-
tem presupposes confidence that a demanding state will not exploit the
action of an asylum state by indulging in outlawed conduct to a returned
fugitive from justice.' 6
The italicized language is mysterious, since it seems both a tacit admission
that the allegations said to be absent from Woodall's petition were in fact in-
volved in the case, and a hint that even if dearly made such allegations might
not necessarily afford a basis for a hearing.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, pointing out - as had Judge Bazelon in
Johnson v. Matthews - that the Court's opinion simply assumed what Wood-
all sought to challenge in order to deny him an opportunity to present some
other challenge which he admittedly was not entitled to make in an asylum
court:
The Court allows him to be returned to Alabama on the theory that he
can apply to the Alabama courts for relief from the torture inflicted on
him. That answer would suffice in the ordinary case. For a prisoner caught
in the mesh of Alabama law normally would need to rely on Alabama law
to extricate him. But if the allegations of the petition are true, this Negro
160. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90 (1952).
161. Id. at 89.
162. Id. at 90.
163. Ibid.
164. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
165. 344 U.S. at 91 (1952).
166. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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must suffer torture and mutilation and risk death itself to get relief in
Alabama.'
67
Justice Douglas, as had Judges Bazelon and O'Connell, thought that the limits
of comity and of the automatic functioning of the extradition process are
reached when prospective irreparable injury is involved:
I am confident that enlightened Alabama judges would make short shrift
of sadistic prison guards. But I rebel at the thought that any human being
.. should be forced to run a gamut of blood and terror in order to get
his constitutional rights. That is too great a price to pay for the legal
principle that before a state prisoner can get federal relief he must exhaust
his state remedies. The enlightened view is indeed the other way. See
Johnson v. Dye... (which unhappily the Court reversed...) ... [Judge
Bazelon dissenting in Johnson v. Matthews; Mattox].108
It is possible, then, that the conflict between the Court and Mr. Justice
Douglas concerned only the proper construction of the petition for habeas cor-
pus. If this is all that Sweeney stands for, it is of little import except to warn
lawyers in the future to draft their petitions carefully so that prospective irre-
parable injury, and that alone, is the ground alleged for relief.10 9 On this view
of the case, however, it is hard to explain why the case was not remanded with
instructions to limit the proceedings to future irreparable injury or to the im-
possibility of getting into court in Alabama. Another view of the case would
see a greater gulf between Mr. Justice Douglas and the majority: Justice
Douglas did not predicate his opinion on the impossibility of ever getting into
court in Alabama, but on the irreparable suffering Woodall would have to
endure at the hands of his jailors before he could get into court; the majority
may have disagreed that such interim suffering is sufficient ground for relief in
an asylum state. On this reading, only allegations such as those in Mattox
would have satisfied the Court - the probability of the murder of the petitioner
before he could get into court, or some other circumstance which would render
it absolutely impossible for him ever to secure judicial consideration of his
claims.170
167. Id. at 92.
168. Id. at 92-93. Mr. Justice Douglas, unlike the majority, couched his opinion in
"exhaustion" terms.
169. On this issue, Mr. Justice Douglas was plainly correct, particularly in view of
the rule that habeas corpus petitions are very liberally construed to preserve their suffi-
ciency. See note 16 supra. Habeas corpus is a civil action, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to amendments of petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1958) ; FED. R. Civ.
P. 81(a) (2). See FFD. R. Civ. P. 15 for the liberal amendment rules applicable. To the
extent that irreparable injury was not sufficiently clearly alleged, the petition could easily
have been amended to conform to the evidence Woodall sought to introduce. Thug what
should have been important was not the formal allegations of the petition, but the proof
that Woodall intended to submit.
170. Presumably a petitioner who is able to secure the services of an attorney in an
asylum state could have that attorney bring habeas corpus on his behalf in the demanding
state - thus even the worst of state prison officials probably could not prevent a court




Sweeney v. Woodall, although it did not descend to the adjudicatory depths
of Johnson v. Dye, is another example of the kind of decision which results
when the arguments presented to the Court fail to place a case in its historical
and doctrinal setting, and when the Court itself fails to fill the void left by the
parties. One thing can be stated with certainty: for all its ambiguity, Sweeney
v. Woodall was dearly intended to exert a conservative influence upon the
development of extradition habeas corpus law.
17 '
2. Judicial Interpretation of Sweeney v. Woodall in Pennsylvania
This conservative import of the Sweeney decision soon manifested itself in
a series of Pennsylvania decisions. 172 The culmination of these cases came in
Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Baldi 7 3 a 1954 decision in which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court eliminated the last shreds of the Mattox broad-scope
inquiry from Pennsylvania law. The petitioner alleged as grounds for relief
that he had been, and if returned would be, subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment in Georgia. The trial judge found that Brown had in fact suffered,
and would suffer, cruel and unusual punishment in Georgia, 174 but refused to
consider evidence that "as a practical matter, resort to the State or federal
courts in Georgia for protection will not be available to relator,"'17 although
171. Query why certiorari was not denied, or the case dismissed as one in which
if had been improvidently granted, and Supreme Court action postponed until the lower
courts had had an opportunity to explore the ramifications of their decisions one way
or the other.
172. In Commonwealth ex rel. Henderson v. Baldi, 372 Pa. 463, 93 A.2d 459 (1953),
an escapee from Georgia sought release because, he said, he had been and would be sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment in Georgia. The court below had excluded the
evidence petitioner offered in support of his allegations. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that Sweeney v. Woodall was on all fours, and precluded the inquiry petitioner
demanded. Only the validity of the extradition proceedings can be challenged on extra-
dition habeas corpus, the court held. Thus Maltox was effectively emasculated. In Com-
monwealth ex rel. Hatton v. Dye, 373 Pa. 502, 96 A.2d 127 (1953), petitioner alleged,
inter alia, that he had and would suffer cruel and unusual punishment in Mississippi -
from whence he had escaped nine years before - and that his life would be in danger
were he returned. The trial judge had found that petitioner's allegations were true, and
ordered him released. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Henderson and Sw'eeney
v. Woodall limit the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts to the traditional narrow scope
extradition habeas corpus inquiry. Even the strictest interpretation of Sweeney ,. Wroodall
would not support this conclusion, since petitioner clearly alleged facts which would have
precluded judicial consideration of his claims were he returned to Mississippi. In Com-
monwealth ex rel. Huey v. Dye, 373 Pa. 508, 96 A2d 129 (1953), petitioner made allega-
tions substantially identical to those in Hatton concerning the danger to his life were he
to be returned to South Carolina. Citing Hatton, the allegations were rejected as beyond
the power of the Pennsylvania courts to consider.
173. 378 Pa. 504, 106 A-2d 777 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939, rehearing denied,
348 U.S. 977 (1955).
174. Id. at 507, 106 A2d at 778.
175. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 11, Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955).
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the record was apparently filled with evidence to that effect.11 0 Notwithstand-
ing its findings of past and prospective cruel and unusual punishment, the
court dismissed Brown's petition on the ground that it was precluded from
granting the relief sought. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Brown attempted to distinguish Sweeney on the ground that he had clearly
alleged that Georgia's remedies would be unavailable to him. The court re-
joined:
[T]he testimony thus presented and the apprehensions thus expressed
cannot be accepted . .. as proof that if relator were now returned to
Georgia he would be prevented from recourse to the courts of that State
or to the Federal courts for the protection of his constitutional rights....
[His allegations to that effect] must be rejected.
17 7
There is thus a nice symmetry in the fact that Pennsylvania, which had given
birth to the broad-scope inquiry in Mattox, interred it ten years later, at
176. Id. at 5-6, 11. Commonwealth ex tel. Brown v. Baldi, 378 Pa. 504, 511-12, 523-26,
106 A.2d 777, 780, 785-87 (1954).
177. Id. at 511-12; 106 A.2d at 780. Judge Musmanno dissented, eloquently and mov-
ingly, arguing that Sweeney v. Woodall was clearly distinguishable because Brown's proof
that Georgia remedies would be unavailable overcame the grounds for the Supreme
Court's reversal in that case. Mattox dearly governed, he argued. Id. at 521, 106 A.2d
at 784. He concluded by arguing that even if its decision was correct, even had the court
correctly interpreted Sweeney v. Woodall, some protection for the petitioner should
have been fashioned. Id. at 535-38, 106 A.2d at 791-92. Certiorari was sought, and denied.
Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955). In his petition for certiorari, Brown sought to dis-
tinguish Sweeney v. Woodall on the same grounds he had argued before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Pennsylvania argued that the issue in the case was jurisdiction, not ex-
haustion, and that the courts of one state are wholly without power to review the actions
of a sister state - whether that state affords relief or not: "a sovereign State shall be
answerable only to the Union." This argument would suggest that the irremediable injury
doctrine, if allowed in the federal courts, is beyond the power of state courts. Brief for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
pp. 3-4, Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955). Georgia agreed with Pennsylvania's juris-
dictional argument, suggesting that the principle of full faith and credit was involved,
Brief for Respondent [Georgia] in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp,
10-19, Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955).
In 1955, two more cases came to the Pennsylvania courts, in both of which the facts
of Brown v. Baldi were stipulated. Commonwealth ex rel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380 Pa. 152,
110 A.2d 240 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Ruch, 380 Pa. 155, 110 A.2d 394
(1955). Brown v. Baldi was cited to dispose of both. See also Commonwealth ex rel.
Heaton v. Harvey,'21 Pa. D.&C.2d 763, 766-67 (C.P.), aff'd on opinion below, 193 Pa.
Super. 315, 164 A.2d 123 (1960) (allegations of danger to life and well-being rejected).
In Commonwealth ex rel. v. Kelley, 6 Pa. D.&C2d 306 (C.P. 1955), the trial court re-
fused to hear allegations of cruel and unusual punishment in Georgia, citing Brown v,
Baldi, but released the petitioner because the extradition papers were not in strict con-
formity with the requirements of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, in force in
Pennsylvania (the receiving agent for Georgia was not the person named in the papers,
and the papers were not in order, being carbon copies with erasures, additions, etc.).
(Vol. 74: 78
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least temporarily, in Brown v. Baldi.'18 During its brief life, the doctrine of
Mattox seems to have released only three petitioners: Mafttox himself, an-
other Pennsylvania extraditee,1 9 and one federal petitioner260
V. CONCLUSION
As has already been noted, one need not read Sweeney v. Woodall as nar-
rowly as have the Pennsylvania courts. Indeed, their reading seems an un-
persuasive one, in view of the fact that the Court attempted to base its decision
upon an alleged absence of any claim that relief in the Alabama courts would
be precluded by Alabama penal officials. Since Sweeney need not be read to
foreclose entirely a broad-scope inquiry, the question of the permissible scope
of inquiry on extradition habeas corpus remains an open one. Within the
bounds set by Sweeney and Johnson v. Dye, and keeping in' mind habeas cor-
pus and extradition doctrine, what situations should justify relief in state or
federal courts in an asylum state?
"Jurisdiction," or, when the detaining authority claims a power to act in-
dependently of a court order, "authority," is the touchstone of traditional
178. Sweeney v. Woodall has also been followed even as to prospective deprivations
in Malory v. McGettrick, 318 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1963), and Lathan v. Reid, 280 F2d 66
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
A number of state courts have considered the scope of extradition habeas corpus
since Sweeney v. Woodall:
(1) New Jersey: In In re Dukes, 26 N.J. Super. 173, 97 A.2d 507, petition for certifi-
cation denied, 13 N.J. 293, 99 A.2d 452 (1953), cert. denied sub nor. Dukes v. Hanna, 347
U.S. 914 (1954), petitioner alleged danger of prospective cruel and unusual punishment,
and sought to distinguish Sweeney v. Woodall on the ground that although he did not
deny the availability of the demanding state's courts, prison officials would frustrate any
attempt at access to them. Without deciding whether Sweeney v. Woodall left this issue
open, the court held that petitioner's proffered (but excluded) proof wvas inadequate since,
based as it was on past experience, it amounted merely to conjecture that past treatment
would be repeated (which, of course - though the court did not note this - is always
the case when a prediction is attempted). In opposing certiorari, New Jersey argued
that its state courts have no power to intervene in the federal process of extradition once
a proper demand is made. Brief of Respondent, p. 10 Dukes v. Hanna, 347 U.S. 914 (1954).
In In re Lee, 62 N.J. Super. 29, 161 A.2d 759 (1960), the court held that Sweeney T,.
Woodall barred petitioner's attempt to avoid extradition on the ground that the demanding
state's prisons were segregated.
(2) New York: Sweeney v. Woodall was followed as to past deprivations in People
ex rel. Gadson on behalf of Morgan v. Hoy, 285 App. Div. 974, 138 N.Y.S2d 704, motion
for leave to appeal denied, 308 N.Y. 1053, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955), and People
ex rel. Reid v. Ruthazer, 4 App. Div. 2d 164, 163 N.Y.S2d 716 (1957).
(3) New Hampshire: Koch v. O'Brien, 101 N.H. 11, 131 A.2d 63 (1957), held that,
although it may have power, an asylum state court is not required by due process to hear
allegations of prospective unconstitutional treatment in a demanding state, citing Sweeney
v. Woodall.
(4) Connecticut: McPheters v. Pollard, 146 Conn. 509, 152 A2d 632 (1959), followed
Sweeney v. Woodall as to past deprivations.
179. See note 86 supra.
180. See note 105 supra.
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habeas corpus inquiry. In order to broaden the scope of habeas corpus the
courts over the years stretched the concept of jurisdictional error to the break-
ing point, until they finally abandoned it in favor of a direct investigation of
whether a petitioner is being held in violation of his constitutional and other
federal rights. When no court proceeding precedes detention, "jurisdiction"
is not relevant; but one would expect a similar development to apply to the
concept of "authority." It is easy, of course, to dismiss both concepts as con-
clusionary rather than as starting points of an investigation. Whether the
governor of an asylum state does, or does not, have "authority" to arrest a
fugitive who has suffered or will suffer cruel and unusual punishment, for ex-
ample, might be considered to depend upon whether the demanding state has
forfeited its right to demand him, and whether the act of returning him would
enable the demanding state to continue its unconstitutional treatment of the
fugitive. It is a mere petitio principii to assert that once the procedural require-
ments for extradition are met the governor has authority, and hence habeas
corpus will not lie. If a fugitive has a right not to be returned to a state which
has treated or will treat him improperly, that right becomes an element in
considering whether the asylum state has authority to extradite him, and -
since the authority to extradite is the only basis for holding him pending ex-
tradition - whether it has the authority to detain him.18 '
On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the limited
investigation that governors have traditionally been expected to make - an
investigation which does not involve casting aspersions upon sister states 182
- and the deeper and more delicate investigation contemplated by broad-scope
extradition habeas corpus. Yet to justify a broad-scope habeas corpus inquiry
on grounds that a governor has no "authority" to extradite to states which
misbehave would place upon governors a new, quite different, and probably
undesirable responsibility.' 83 Similarly, it would place upon state courts a
responsibility which might better be limited to the federal courts. In short,
unlike the traditional narrow-scope inquiry in extradition proceedings, the
proposed broader-scope investigation, whatever its specific contours might be,
would - if couched in terms of the "authority" of the asylum state - involve
asylum governors and courts in a delicate undertaking which they probably do
not want to assume, 184 and which would violate the principle that "a sovereign
181. See, for an analysis in this vein, Comment, The Limits of Constitutional Inquiry
on Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 21 U.Cir. L. REv. 735, 745-47 (1954).
182. See Executive Practices for a full discussion of the very damaging effects upon
interstate harmony that such investigations by governors can have. Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860), arose out of such an investigation.
183. Unless, that is, one could speak of a governor as having no authority to do a
thing, but as having no responsibility not to do it. To argue in that manner would be to
deprive both words of any recognizable meaning.
184. It is noteworthy that the only state whose courts fully accepted the broad scope
inquiry was Pennsylvania (Mattox) - though New York made a gesture in that direc-
tion, see People ex rel. Pahl v. Pollack, 174 Misc. 981, 22 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Cf. People ex rel. Reid v. Warden, 63 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1946); People ex rel.
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state shall be answerable only to the Union."18 5 Ordinary habeas corpus has
outgrown the concept of "jurisdiction ;" there seems no reason why extradition
habeas corpus should be limited by the concept of "authority."
The federal courts, in any event, need not be concerned with an asylum
state's "authority" to extradite. Extradition is a federal matter, and the federal
courts have the power - normally foreclosed to the state courts - to deter-
mine whether a person is properly detained by authority of the United
States. 8 6 Federal "habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very
tissue of the structure;"187 one form the federal courts could cut through is
that of extradition. They need not be bound by the myth that extradition is
merely procedural, without effect on substantive rights.'88 They can go beyond
the narrow-scope inquiry's reliance merely upon the adequacy of the ex-tradi-
tion demand, and consider the underlying facts from which the demand de-
Jackson v. Ruthazer, 276 App. Div. 832, 93 N.Y.S2d 729 (1949), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 90 N.E.2d 69, 300 N.Y. 762 (1950).
185. Brief for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, p. 4, Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955).
One theory that has been proposed in order to give substance to the argument that a
governor is without authority to leliver a fugitive to a state in which he would suffer
irreparable injury either before he could secure judicial relief, or because he could not
secure such relief, is that of "state action.' Since an asylum state cannot be forced to
extradite, the theory runs, it assumes responsibility for the actions of the demanding
state if it does extradite. If the demanding state's actions will be both unconstitutional
and irreparable, then the asylum becomes a party to the unconstitutionality. No state has
authority to act unconstitutionally; therefore authority to detain petitioner being wanting,
habeas corpus lies. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 (1860), however, upon
which the argument that extradition is not mandatory relies, did not so hold; the case
held only that extradition is not federally mandamnzusable. Chief Justice Taney's opinion
discussed at length, and rejected, the notion that extradition is discretionary; he described
the asylum governor's function as follows:
He has no right to look behind [the extradition papers] . .. , or to question them,
or to look into the character of the crime specified in this judicial proceeding
[i.e. of the demanding state]. The duty which he is to perform is, as we have al-
ready said, merely ministerial ....
Id. at 106. The asylum governor, then, has no more authority not to extradite than he has,
on the state action theory, authority to extradite. The state action theory seems quickly to
resolve itself into a paradox. It tells us nothing about the "authority" of the asylum state
to extradite, and therefore does not require the uncomfortable conclusion that the execu-
tives and courts of the asylum state must judge and, if necessary, condemn the executives
and courts of sister states. See, for a full statement of the theory, Horowitz & Steinberg,
The Fourteenth Amendment - Its Newly Recognired Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas
Corpus in Extradition, 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 441, 455-57 (1950). The theory was adopted
in Application of Mfiddlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 953 (S.D. Cal. 1950), re'crsed on other
grounds mb nom. Ross v. Afiddlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951).
186. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1), (3) (1958); see note 47 supra.
187. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see note
14 supra and accompanying text.
188. See, for an example of this myth in action, Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677,
682 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
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rives.18s Having cut through the form of extradition, the federal courts can
properly consider whether the demanding state should be allowed to take ad-
vantage of the federal extradition process to perpetrate irreparable deprivations
of constitutional right. As federal courts, they are in the business of testing
state institutions against the requirements of the Constitution, and need feel
no special compunction about doing so in the extradition context, if the exi-
gencies of the situation demand such federal intervention.19 0 The analogy from
federal injunctions of state criminal prosecutions is instructive: the federal
courts have felt such intervention, though undesirable, the lesser evil when
irreparable injuries are involved. 9 1 The exhaustion rule - with its exception
for cases in which there is an absence of state remedies or circumstances ren-
dering available remedies ineffective - is the product of another accommoda-
tion analogous to that of the injunction cases. A fact which distinguishes
extradition cases from the exhaustion and injunction situations is that the
federal court which considers the validity of a demanding state's treatment of
its prisoners is not a federal court whose jurisdiction normally includes prob-
lems arising out of actions by the demanding state. But federal courts are pre-
eminently courts of the entire nation, not associated merely with the locale in
which they sit. Why some federal courts have found this distinguishing fact
so critical as to deprive them of jurisdiction 192 is hard to see 193 - although
189. Cf. notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. The narrow-scope inquiry on ex-
tradition habeas corpus developed at a time when the inquiry on habeas corpus generally
was limited to the adequacy of the papers in the return.
190. See, for a fuller statement of this argument, Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel
Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271, 279 (1950).
191. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1950); Johnson v.
Matthews, 182 F2d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
193. The Third Circuit, in Johnson v. Dye, found no such difficulty, Nor has the
Second: United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), ceri. deiticd,
339 U.S. 980 (1950) (comity, not power, is the issue) ; United States ex rel. Tucker v.
Donovan, 321 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1963) (same). Nor the Ninth: Ross v. Middlebrooks,
188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951) (same). A fascinating series of cases in the Second Circuit
has raised the problem of the "power" in the federal courts of one circuit to consider
the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings in another circuit. Under New York
procedure, a prisoner serving a multiple-felon sentence cannot challenge in New York's
courts the prior felony conviction on which it is based if the conviction was in another
state; he usually cannot challenge it in the foreign state either, since he is not there, The
Second Circuit has held that in such a situation the prisoner can challenge the constitu-
tionality of the prior conviction in the federal courts of New York in order to vindicate
his right to have his New York sentence reduced. United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder,
183 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950). In United States ex el. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742 (2d
Cir. 1956), the situation was further complicated because the petitioner was a fugitive
from the state where he had been convicted of the prior felony. New York argued that
he had waived his right to challenge the foreign state's conviction by fleeing its jurisdiction.
"To this," the court said, "may be added certain considerations of policy - the undesIra-
bility of testing a Virginia conviction in a federal court in New York and a court's reluc-
tance to listen to a prisoner who is a fugitive from justice. We do not find these argu-
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it goes directly to the question of forum non conveniens.M1
Federal habeas corpus power can be contrasted with that of the states on
the ground that since extradition is pursuant to federal law, a petitioner can be
considered, in relation to the right of a demanding state to take advantage of
the process, pro tanto a federal prisoner.195 Rather than lumping the two prob-
lems within the concept of the "authority" of the asylum state to arrest a
fugitive, it seems preferable to distinguish between the power of the asylum
merits persuasive:' Id. at 478. The arguments boiled down to forum non convenies and
deterrence, versus the prospect of an innocent man serving an unmerited sentence as a
second offender, and the latter must prevail Ibid. Sweeney v. Woodall was deemed inappli-
cable because there the petitioner could get relief when returned, whereas here petitioner
challenged the custody of the asylum state. Id. at 748-49. This last point was taken up in
United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962), in which the
court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) requires exhaustion of the remedies only of the state
whose custody is being challenged (i.e. New York), and hence a multiple-felon petitioner
need not show an attempt to exhaust the foreign state's remedies. Possible indignity to
the foreign state does not justify putting petitioner to an extra proceeding. Nor is the
foreign state's judgment challenged - only New York's right to rely on it. (Query
whether the court would approve if New York state courts undertook to look behind
sister state convictions.) This theory that only the custody of New York is being chal-
lenged cannot distinguish away the extradition cases, where the custody of the asylm
state is challenged (on ground that it is not justified by the demand). The difference is
that in the multiple-felon cases, affording a petitioner relief has no effect on the foreign
state's right to punish him. Cf. United States ex rel. Tucker v. Warden, 217 F. Supp.
373, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd mtb iwm. United States ex rel. Tucker v. Donovan, 321
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1963). Even this difference may not have obtained in Smith, supra.
LaNear has opened up a small flood of petitions to the New York District Courts. See, e.g.,
United States ex reL Compton v. Wilkins, 315 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1963) (remand to state
on condition that petitioner be resentenced) ; United States ex rel. Noll v. Fay, 219 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (same) ; United States ex rel. Barnes v. Fay, 219 F. Supp. 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (held against petitioner on merits). In United States cx rel. McCray v.
LaVallee, 220 F. Supp. 846 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), the court refused to apply the LaNear rule
where the prior conviction was in a federal court, on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1958) gives petitioners adequate opportunity to challenge the prior conviction in the sen-
tencing court. On the LaNear rationale that only the New York custody is challenged, this
result is dearly wrong; yet it is clearly right as a matter of common sense and sound
judicial administration. The inconsistency with LaNear is a result of the fact that the
Second Circuit insisted upon retaining in that case the fiction that no act of the foreign
state was being challenged, in order to avoid the burden of Sweeney v. Wrfoodall.
For situations similar to that in the multiple-felon cases, see In re Ross, 48 F. Supp.
815 (D. Ore. 1942), in which petitioner was permitted to challenge on federal habeas
corpus in Oregon his commitment by an Arizona court to a Veterans' Administration
Hospital in Arizona when the V.A. had subsequently transferred him to an Oregon V.A.
hospital; In the Matter of the Application of Pate, petition filed, No. 42683, District Court,
N.D. Cal., Aug. 5, 1964, in which habeas corpus is being sought in a California federal
court on behalf of a Nevada convict confined in a California prison under the terms of the
Western Interstate Corrections Compact, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11190-96, and in which
LaNear is being relied upon as to "jurisdiction" and "e.xaustion." See Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, In the Matter of the Application of Pate, supra.
194. See Sutherland, supra note 190, at 278-79.
195. See notes 47 & 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
state to detain him, and the right of the demanding state to demand him The
first question should depend only upon whether the prerequisite to such de-
tention - a lawful demand - has occurred, hence upon the technical require-
ments of the extradition clause and implementing statute; it may therefore
appropriately be considered by the state courts of the asylum state, as a part
of their general duty to protect citizens from unlawful detention.
The second question, however, involves both characterization of the demand-
ing state's conduct and resolution of a conflict between constitutional prin-
ciples, "one promoting efficiency and comity between states, the other protect-
ing fundamental rights of the individual."'1 Considerations of interstate comity
suggest that this duty is more appropriately filled by the federal courts. These
considerations, embodied in the extradition clause and the spirit of full faith
and credit, should preclude a state court from sitting in judgment upon the
criminal processes of sister states. The federal system is the source of the
comity obligation of the states, however, and federal courts are not within the
matrix of interstate comity. This is not to say that the federal courts may
ignore considerations of interstate comity when rendering decisions which
affect relations between states. But as national courts they are in a position to
accommodate the demands of comity between the states to other national con-
siderations - in this case, to the protection of individual constitutional rights,
Furthermore, in extradition cases it is a federally established procedure -
for which the federal courts should have a special responsibility - which is
the source of the potential danger to individual rights. Thus, in deciding
whether an extraditee is properly held by authority of the United States, the
federal courts alone should have the power to resolve a clash between con-
196. For the full quotation from Judge Bazelon's dissent in Johnson v. Matthews, see
text at note 130 .rpra. See In re Wallace. 38 Wash. 2d 67, 227 P.2d 737 (1951), in which
the court carefully distinguished the power of state courts on extradition from that of
federal courts, holding that, unlike the federal courts, state courts are without jurisdiction
to consider whether the demanding state has forfeited its right to use the extradition proc-
ess. The court thought that federal jurisdiction as to such claims is exclusive, and that
full faith and credit bars one state's courts from considering the constitutionality of a
sister state's criminal justice. A New York court has observed, in the same vein:
The Federal compact does not tender either the duty or the power to every
State to supervise the intramural judicial processes of the others. Where those
processes may reach a point of conflict with the United States Constitutlon in the
nature of things, the Federal courts are the arbiters and make the necessary inquiry
and render the appropriate judgment; but even they, by traditional law, by comity,
and, indeed, by due deference to the nature of the Federal structure, do not act
until available remedies within. the State itself have been exhausted.
People ex rel. Reid v. Ruthazer, 4 App. Div. 2d 164, 163 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1957) (reversing
release onr ground that voidness of conviction in demanding state is not open on extradi.
tion habeas corpus). See also Brief for Respondent [New Jersey], p. 10, Dukes v. Hanna,
347 U.S. 914 (1954), arguing that because extradition is a federal matter, state courts
cannot intervene once the duty to extradite has been established by an adequate demand,
Brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, pp. 6-7, Brown v. Baldi, 348 U.S. 939 (1955) ; notes 177-78 sitpra.
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stitutional provisions: that which requires extradition, and those which ex-
tradition, mechanically carried out, would frustrate.107
Since, in the abstract, it is difficult to weigh the demands of federalism
against the importance of giving effective protection to individual rights, a
consideration of the specific situations in which a broad-scope inquiry would
be warranted may serve to facilitate an accommodation of these conflicting
ends. Substantially all commentators have agreed with justice Douglas and
with judges Bazelon and O'Connell that the broad-scope inquiry should be
limited to prospective irreparable injury. Past deprivations as such may be
eliminated as proper subjects of inquiry on extradition habeas corpus: what-
ever relief is appropriate can equally well be secured in the courts of the de-
manding state.198 Even when the allegations are of the most horrible cruel and
unusual punishment - and even if it be thought that the Constitution requires
the release of a person who has been so ill-treated - relief can be adequately
afforded by the demanding state's courts, which are subject to the same ulti-
mate supervision by the Supreme Court and therefore in theory administer
the same constitutional law as do the courts in the asylum state. For the same
reason, the voidness of any proceeding prior to the demand for extradition is
no ground for relief beyond the narrow scope traditionally afforded. Forum
non conveniens alone affords sufficient justification for an absolute rule pre-
cluding consideration of such past deprivations. The doctrine that federal
courts generally will not intervene in state proceedings to protect constitu-
tional rights until the state courts have had an opportunity to decide the issues
presented is as applicable here as it is in the injunction and exhaustion situa-
tions. Most important, the equality of pre- and post-extradition remedies where
only past deprivations are involved removes any justification for interfering
in the operation of extradition. Constitutional provisions are not in unavoid-
able conflict.
It seems clear that the broad-scope inquiry should go only to prospective
irreparable injuries. What, then, constitutes a "prospective irreparable in-
jury?" Prospective inability to secure relief for past deprivations of constitu-
tional rights surely qualifies, since denial of access to the courts, state or fed-
eral, is itself a denial of a constitutional right, and renders the custody which
involves such denial unconstitutional. 199 The prospect of unconstitutional treat-
ment for which no remedy will be available at all is another clear case of irrep-
arable injury; danger of lynching, as in Afattox, certainly provides such a
prospect, since once the danger materializes court relief is intrinsically impos-
sible.
197. A final consideration supporting the proposed distinction between the roles of
state and federal courts is one of flexibility of remedy. If relief less than full release is
possible and desirable, federal courts are in a better position to afford it. The type of relief
less than release suggested in this Comment would probably be precluded to a state court.
See notes 226-33 infra and accompanying text.
198. Thus the concurrence of Judge O'Connell in Jolison v. Dye -as the better view.
199. Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
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The difficult question is whether a serious deprivation which will occur
before an extraditee can secure court relief - and for which such relief may
be inherently inadequate - comes within the concept of a prospective irrep.
arable injury. It is reparable in the sense that petitioner will be able to secure
such remedy as the law affords; it is irreparable in the sense that no legal
remedy can restore what has been lost. The issue here is extremely important
to the scope of federal extradition habeas corpus. Since federal habeas corpus
can be brought by a third party on behalf of a person improperly detained, "°0
it is doubtful whether an extraditee who could not make out a case that his
life would be endangered could successfully show that he would not be able
to get into court if returned. Prison policy could not normally prevent him
from securing a hearing, unless, for example, no third person were available
to bring habeas corpus on his behalf. Only if an interim injury in its nature
irreparable is sufficient basis for relief in the asylum state will such a petitioner
be entitled to relief.
As indicated, most interim injuries will be irreparable in the sense that
whatever legal remedy there may be will not make good the damage done, or
at least not fully. Thus a petitioner who claims that the indictment or con-
viction underlying the demand is void could argue that although he will be
able to challenge it if returned, he will be subjected to the irreparable injury
of detention pending a finding that he is entitled to release. Even if monetary
compensation for his interim loss of liberty were available, few will argue that
it could ever be really commensurate to the deprivation endured. Yet this sort
of irreparable injury is an intrinsic, if unfortunate, part of our system of crim-
inal justice; there seems no special reason, at least barring a conviction so
patently void that the demand for extradition is a frivolous harassment, why
an extraditee should be exempt from what all others must suffer.201 On the
other hand, if the interim injury involves running "a gamut of blood and ter-
ror," it is, in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, "too great a price to pay"
for the vindication of a constitutional right.202 Whether the injury is the sort
of deprivation which the law is not ordinarily willing to tolerate pending a
judicial hearing on the merits of a claim should be the test of whether, as an
interim injury, it should be considered irreparable.2°3 Injuries which are in-
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1958); Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert,
dcnied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958).
201. See note 66 supra for cases holding that the unconstitutionality of the criminal
law on which the indictment is based affords no ground for relief on extradition habeaq
corpus. Though frequently alleged, the voidness of a conviction has never been made the
basis for relief on extradition habeas corpus.
202. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 92 (1952). For the full quotation, see text at
note 168 supra. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16 (1963), for the principle that
the federal habeas corpus power is the result of a decision in favor of individual rights.
when in conflict with institutional - that is, Federalism - needs.
203. The limits of tolerance for interim injuries in our constitutional system can be
derived from such areas of doctrine as the "substantial injury" that will justify a federal
injunction of a state criminal proceeding. See cases cited at note 81 supra. The right to
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trinsic, necessary elements of the criminal process can be distinguished from
injuries which are gratuitous. For example, a modest period of detention be-
fore a hearing should be considered not an irreparable injury; a very long
period, if petitioner could show facts that would necessarily and unconstitu-
tionally cause it, should be deemed within the meaning of "irreparable injury."
Similarly, some kinds of treatment -e.g., inadequate food or medical care -
which might be deemed cruel and unusual if imposed for substantial periods
of time, are perhaps tolerable for the brief interim between return and relief
in the demanding state's courts. Nor should interim racial segregation in the
demanding state's prison be deemed so serious as to warrant relief in the
asylum state.2"
"Prospective irreparable injury," then, includes both total unavailability of
relief for past or prospective deprivations, and interim injuries which are in-
tolerably severe. It seems clear in this context that a weighing of the extradi-
tion clause and its bases in efficiency, comity and the integrity of state judicial
processes against the individual constitutional rights at stake should result in
the protection of the latter at the expense of the former. In an unavoidable dash
between abstract, general principles of good government, and concrete, im-
mediate human rights, the latter should prevail. This is the ultimate justifi-
cation for the important role habeas corpus plays in American constitutional
law.205 A state which will not honor its constitutional obligations to a prisoner
should not be allowed to take advantage of the constitutional procedure of ex-
tradition in order to secure power over that prisoner. In summary, the scope
of federal habeas corpus in extradition proceedings should extend to the con-
sideration of allegations that extradition will result in a substantial and irrep-
arable deprivation of constitutional rights.& 0
The question remains whether Sweeney v. Woodall forecloses as grounds
for relief in the federal courts of the asylum state any intolerable interim in-
jury that will be suffered by the extraditee in the demanding state; it has been
noted above that this is a plausible interpretation of the Court's holding. But
it seems proper, particularly in view of the quite inadequate briefing, lack
of oral argument, and unsatisfactory opinion in the case, to choose instead
a speedy trial and to release on bail are examples of limitations on interim injury built
into our constitutional fabric.
204. Cf. In re Lee, 62 N.J. Super. 29, 161 A.2d 759 (1960).
205. Judge Bazelon's words in Johnson v. Matthews are worth recalling in this re-
gard. See quotation in text at note 130 supra.
206. One collateral advantage of allowing such a broad scope inquiry will be to bring
to light the despicable penal practices that apparently continue to flourish in some parts
of the United States, particularly in the South.
There can be no doubt but that the federal courts, on habeas corpus, can act to prevent
prospective deprivations - indeed, this is the case every time a petitioner is released from
custody because his conviction was void. Cf. Rogge & Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil
Rights, and the Federal System, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 509 (1953). Cf. also Louisiana ex rM.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (all opinions assume that, if relief from pros-
pective cruel and unusual punishment were appropriate on the merits, it could be given).
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an interpretation which would not require the unfortunate result with which
Mr. Justice Douglas was concerned. Sweeney can therefore be construed to
require only careful pleading, so that the allegation of prospective irreparable
injury is plain. The case stands at least for the proposition that the absence
of state remedies in the demanding state is an insufficient ground for relief -
since if the state courts fail, the federal courts, and ultimately review by the
Supreme Court, are available. But Sweeney need not be taken to preclude re-
lief for an irreparable injury clearly alleged and adequately proved.207
207. The burden, of proof problem is particularly difficult. On the one hand, a peti-
tioner who seeks release is unlikely to be a very reliable witness in his own behalf -
though special circumstances, as existed in Brown v. Baldi, may mitigate this disability.
He is unlikely to be able to present any evidence on his own behalf other than scars -
which are of dubious corroborative value - and other escaped prisoners who are as in-
trustworthy as himself; if he is lucky, he may be able to find a prisoner who has served
his term, and has nothing concrete to gain from making prison conditions sound worse
than they are. But such a witness may be of little value since his testimony can be
objected to on the ground that things have changed since his release. Added to this dif-
ficulty is the fact that petitioner must convince the court that his prediction of the future
is accurate, a hard burden even in the ordinary case. Cf. note 84 supra. Against these
almost insuperable odds are ranged the presumption in favor of the regularity of state
behavior, the testimony of witnesses for the demanding state who bear the stamp of re-
spectability and hence credibility, and the ease with which assurances of reformed condi-
tions and proper treatment in the future can be given. In short, the situation for a peti-
tioner is even worse than that faced by a defendant who seeks to convince a court that a
confession was extracted from him by force. In the latter circumstance the Supreme Court
has developed the doctrine of "inherently coercive" situations; but it seems inconceivable
that any similar presumption against demanding states would ever be entertained, But e/.
Harper v. Wall. 85 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D.N.J. 1949) (petitioner's allegations carry con-
viction "when fitted into the pattern of the realities as they are known"). Only rarely
will an implicit admission by the demanding state, such as occurred in Maltox, not be a
necessary element of a petitioner's case.
On the other hand, Georgia has complained bitterly of the inconvenience and expense
to it of having to appear all over the country to defend itself against allegations which
cover many years in varying places, on pain of being presumed against if it fails to do so,
It has also objected to the refusal of some judges to allow it to take depositions in Georgia,
and to the inadequate notice which has been given it in some cases. Alabama has simply
refused to bother to appear at all.
These difficulties cannot be cured. Notice, evidence by deposition (assuming an oppor-
tunity for the opposing party to cross-examine the deponent, or at least to submit cross-
interrogatories), adequate time to collect evidence and prepare its case, and similar con-
sideration should of course be afforded a demanding state. But inconvenience and expense
to it should not defeat the right of a petitioner to a hearing - these go only to the forum
non convenens problem, and although a forum may be inconvenient for a party, if it is
the only available forum the inconvenience must be put up with. A demanding state's case
cannot fail to suffer if it refuses to appear, but it should not be presumed against; the
presiding judge must do the best he can, with the help of the Attorney General of the
asylum state, who usually represents the nominal defendant.
Through all these difficulties, the burden of proof required is that appropriate to any
other civil case: petitioner must convince the judge that it is more likely than not that
an irreparable injury will follow his return. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
To make the burden heavier than this would be to make the petitioner's objective tnob-
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Even if it were impossible to treat Sweeney as fully compatible with the
scope of extradition habeas corpus proposed in this Comment, the case may
justifiably be deemed overruled 208 - not because a subsequent Supreme Court
decision has reached a contrary result, but because the era of habeas corpus
law to which Sweeney belongs has been thoroughly repudiated. In Fay v.
Noia (1963)209 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, described the
basic continuity in the conception of habeas corpus as the remedy for convic-
tions based on "proceedings so fundamentally defective as to make imprison-
ment pursuant to them constitutionally intolerable."210 But, he candidly con-
ceded,
We do not suggest that this Court has always followed an unwavering
line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our de-
velopment of the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended, seem-
ingly, with some backing and filling 21 '
The period of the late Forties and early Fifties was a time of just such back-
ing and filling; Sweeney and Johnson v. Dye were in such legalistic company
as Darr v. Burford (1950),212 and Sunal v. Large (1947). 213 But the ex-
tremely restrictive view of the exhaustion requirement taken by these cases
began to falter with Brown v. Allen (1953)214 and was finally and decisively
repudiated in Fay v. Noia, where the Court went out of its way to overrule
Darr v. Burford.215 The Court made it absolutely clear in Fay v. Noia that it
intended to establish an entirely new foundation for much of habeas corpus
tainable, and to frustrate the purpose of having the hearing at all. How strongly convinced
a judge will insist upon being made will depend, of course, on the nature of the relief he
can give; if restricted to full release, he will probably demand far greater persuasion than
if less drastic remedies are available.
208. In this regard, consider Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F.
Supp. 251, 252-53 (S.D. W.Va. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Martin v. Savage Truck
Line, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
209. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
210. Id. at 414.
211. Id. at 411-12.
212. 339 U.S. 200 (1950). Held: a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court is a
necessary element of the exhaustion: of state remedies prerequisite to the availability of
federal habeas corpus. Overruling (in effect) Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). Over-
ruled in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
213. 332 U.S. 174 (1947). Held: because habeas corpus is not to substitute for appeal,
failure to take a timely appeal (in this case from a federal conviction) bars use of habeas
corpus after the time for appeal has run. But cf. Fay v. Noia, slpra note 212.
214. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Held: only one avenue of state relief need be exhausted;
denial of certiorari to the highest state court on that avenue is of no significance to a lower
federal court on habeas corpus.
215. Held: failure to seek a timely appeal from a state conviction is no bar to federal
habeas corpus unless the failure was "deliberate;" Darr v. Burlord overruled - exhaus-
tion need not include a petition for certiorari. In another area, the territorial jurisdiction
of a federal court on habeas corpus, a similar change from a restrictive holding in the
late Forties has taken place. Compare Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), wills Jones
v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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law - particularly in its relationship to problems of federalism.210 The balance
between the institutional needs of federalism and protection of individual con-
stitutional rights was weighted far more heavily in favor of the latter in Fay
v. Nokz than it had been in the cases contemporary with Sweeney.217 It is
impossible to believe, after reading Fay v. Noia, that the Court would follow
Sweeney to the extent that that decision must be construed to limit the federal
courts to a narrow-scope inquiry on extradition habeas corpus. In sum,
Sweeney probably can be construed as consistent with a broad-scope inquiry;
but to the extent it cannot, it was not entitled to much respect even when
delivered 21 and may in any case legitimately be deemed overruled by subse-
quent history. It therefore presents no bar to the position urged in this Com-
ment.
Having decided that prospective irreparable injury to constitutional rights
in the demanding state should be a basis for relief on federal habeas corpus
in the asylum state, the question remains, what is the status of the exhaustion
requirement of Johnson v. Dye? Of the four possible interpretations of the
Supreme Court's opinion, we concluded that only two were likely: that a peti-
tioner cannot, on extradition habeas corpus, change from state to federal court
in midstream; or that a petitioner must seek relief in the asylum state courts,
and exhaust his remedies there before bringing federal habeas corpus.210 It is
now possible to make a more sophisticated application of the exhaustion prin-
ciple to extradition habeas corpus. If a petitioner seeks relief on the traditional
narrow-scope ground of deficiencies in the extradition procedure, his allega-
tion goes to the power of the asylum state's governor to have him arrested.
For such relief, it is appropriate that he exhaust his state remedies first.
220
216. See, for an explicit indication, 372 U.S. at 439 n.44:
To the extent that any decisions of this Court may be read to suggest a standard
of discretion in federal habeas corpus different from what we lay down today, such
decisions shall be deemed overruled to the extent of any inconsistency.
217. Compare the legalistic flavor of Sweeney:
Considerations fundamental to our federal system require that the prisoner test the
claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in the courts of that State.
344 U.S. at 90, with the quite different flavor of Fay v. Noia:
It should be unnecessary to repeat what so often has been said and what so plainly
is the case: that the availability of the Great Writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts for persons in the custody of the States offends no legitimate state interest
in the. enforcement of criminal justice or procedure. . . . [F]ew indeed Is the
number of state prisoners who eventually win their freedom by means of federal
habeas corpus. Those fev who are ultimately successful are persons whom society
has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compen-
sation.
372 U.S. at 440-41.
218. "Decisions of this Court do not have equal intrinsic authority." Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219. See notes 111-14 supra and accompanying text.
220. "Exhaustion" is being used in a non-technical sense here. Strictly, since an ex-
traditee is in custody pursuant to federal authority, not pursuant to a state court judgment,
no § 2254 "exhaustion" is needed. But comity requires a principle of accommodation when
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On the other hand, if he seeks relief from prospective irreparable injury, the
state courts should be without power to afford it; exhaustion of state remedies
would be appropriate only if he also relies upon narrow-scope grounds. Relief
from prospective irreparable injury should be available only as a last resort;
more conventional bases of relief, when they exist, should be exhausted first,
and should be exhausted in the first instance in the state courts. Johnson v.
Dye has this much vitality and should have no more.2'
A second problem flowing from our conclusion that the federal courts should
entertain a broad-scope inquiry is that of the finality to be accorded to the
release as a result of such an inquiry. The normal rule is that, while a denial
of relief on habeas corpus has no res judicata effect,2-" release on habeas cor-
pus is res judicata as to the issues involved in the decision. -3a After release of
an extraditee on traditional narrow-scope extradition habeas corpus, a de-
manding state can overcome mere technical defects in the papers simply by
initiating a second demand. But since a release pursuant to a broad-scope in-
quiry would be based upon a finding of lack of right in the demanding state
to take advantage of extradition procedure, the demanding state could not
merely begin the process again. Nor could the demanding state wait until the
fugitive entered the jurisdiction of a different federal court, hoping there to
find a judge less willing to believe the fugitive's allegations. Barring a success-
ful appeal, its right to demand the fugitive would have been settled.224 But
what should be the result if the demanding state alleges, and can show, that
the conditions which led the court to release the fugitive no longer obtain?
The release was based upon specific findings of fact; while res judicata as to
those facts, it cannot bar a new adjudication based upon new facts of the
right of the demanding state to take advantage of the extradition process. Such
a new adjudication does not collaterally attack the release because, although
the parties are the same, the issue is different. If the asylum state's governor,
faced with a new demand,225 honors the request, and there are no technical
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See text following note 120 supra.
It must be recognized that a substantial body of case-law is contrary to the position ad-
vocated here, though some recent cases support it. See note 49 supra.
221. See notes 115-21 mpra and accompanying text for the significance, in this regard,
of the Court's citation of Ex parte Hawk rather than § 2254.
222. See note 11 supra.
223. See it re Kimler, 37 Cal. 2d 568, 572-73, 579-81, 233 P2d 902, 905, 909-10, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951), and In re Bailleaux, 47 Cal. 2d 258, 261, 302 P.2d E01, 802-03
(1956), wherein the California, federal and common law rules (all of which give res
judicata effect to a release) are discussed. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Wadley v.
Baldi, 88 Pa. D.&C. 165, 166-67 (C.P. 1953) ("Where one has been discharged on habeas
corpus, and has been, rearrested, the crucial question is whether the same issue as was
decided in the habeas corpus proceeding is the basis for the arrest. . .').
224. See In re Bailleaux, sipra note 223, for consideration of this issue.
225. The demanding state's power to initiate a new adjudication by seeking to
re-open the habeas corpus action would be limited by the fact that FED. L Crv. P. 60(b)
imposes a "reasonable time" limitation upon the reopening of a case. On the other hand,
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
defects on which the state or federal courts can predicate release, the demand-
ing state will have an opportunity to convince a federal judge that the con-
ditions upon which the prior release was based have changed. But, because it
must convince the court that the prior release is not res judicata on the issue,
the demanding state bears the burden of proof in such a new adjudication; it
must affirmatively show that the conditions upon which the prior release was
based have changed, to the extent that there is no longer a sufficient danger of
prospective irreparable injury.
Since it shifts the burden of proof to the demanding state in a habeas corpus
hearing following a second demand, the principle of res judicata alone will
make it difficult for a demanding state to succeed with such a second demand.
There are, moreover, good reasons why courts should, and undoubtedly would,
emphasize the difficulty of succeeding on a second demand. General equitable
principles of laches - protection of the legitimate expectations and reliance
of the released extraditee - dictate a very dim view of second demands. And
although the principle of double jeopardy is not technically applicable, since a
demand for extradition is not a criminal prosecution, the spirit which it em-
bodies is surely relevant. Particularly when the second demand comes after a
substantial lapse of time and after the creation by the erstwhile extraditee of
a new existence for himself, it should probably be barred altogether.
We have shown that a broad-scope inquiry on extradition habeas corpus
should be afforded, even if release were the only remedy available. But the
broad-scope inquiry would be more palatable if relief less than release were
possible. We have seen that the federal courts are not restricted to full release
on habeas corpus, but are explicitly given the power to "dispose of the matter
as law and justice require. 220 A number of modes of relief short of full re-
lease have been suggested.227 That which appears most promising, although
since there is good reason to desire that the demanding state's power to seek a readjudi-
cation in a particular case on the grounds of changed circumstances be severely limited
temporally (see text following note 225), it might be sensible to allow a demanding state
to proceed only by reopening the original case. This would impose the time limit of Rule
60b, and would have the collateral advantages of preventing demanding states from harass-
ing petitioner by such devices as repetitive demands and forum-shopping. Presumably the
fact that the demanding state, though it is actually the real party in interest, is not the
technical defendant could be easily overcome.
226. See text accompanying notes 17-23 stpra.
227. Consider, for example, the following:
(1) remand into the custody of a United States Marshal, with directions to take peti-
tioner to the demanding state but to keep him in custody until he has been able to get into
court. The primary drawback is that there seems to be no source of power in a court to
do so. Queries: would the demanding state's courts consider such custody grounds for
habeas corpus or other state relief? could petitioner proceed directly in the federal courts
on the theory that circumstances existed rendering state relief ineffective? what would
be his ground for relief from the custody (of the marshal) in which he would actually be?
The same effect as remand into the custody of a marshal might be secured if the asylum
court were to induce the United States Attorney in the demanding state to initiate a prose-
cution of the petitioner under the Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1958) (though
the crimes for which this can be done are limited). Petitioner would then be removed to
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by no means simple, is the possibility that a federal court in the asylum state
could transfer the cause to a federal 6ourt in the demanding state. It is difficult
to see what advantages would accrue from a true transfer= 5 (i.e., transfer
of the case testing the custody of the asylum state) - beyond some saving of
energy from a forum non conveniens standpoint. If the hearing by the federal
court in the demanding state goes to the same question as that before the fed-
eral court in the asylum state - whether the demanding state is without right
to take advantage of the extradition process - only the conzveniens difference
is involved. In fact, the demanding state federal court might find itself quite
limited as to remedy, assuming the petitioner had been transferred along with
the cause.2m If release were granted, the demanding state could arrest the
petitioner before he had had an opportunity to leave the state.
the demanding state to stand trial for the federal offense, and could undertake to persuade
the local federal court of the ineffectiveness of that state's remedies to protect him against
irreparable injury. Then the question would become, what relief could a federal court in
the demanding state give to a petitioner seeking to avoid being handed over (before or
after federal -conviction. and sentence) to state authorities.
(2) remand to the demanding state on condition that it post bond for the proper
treatment of petitioner. Apart from other difficulties, the demanding state would un-
doubtedly consider that its honor precluded it from posting such a bond.
228. A true transfer would be subject to a number of technical difficulties. Is the
duty of a federal court on habeas corpus to dispose of the case "as law and justice require"
sufficient authority for such relief? 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1958) gives the Supreme Court,
the Justices, and circuit judges power to transfer an application for writ of habeas corpus
"to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it," but this statute is clearly de-
signed to allow transfers down the judicial hierarchy, not transfers laterally, and in any
case does not authorize transfers by district courts. Apart from problems with the phrase
"the district court having jurisdiction' (emphasis added; see below), it would be a liter-
alistic misreading of § 2241(b) to interpret it as authorizing a circuit court judge, on
appeal from the dismissal of a petition. for broad scope extradition habeas corpus, to trans-
fer the case to a demanding state federal court. The general transfer statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1958), empowers a district court to transfer an action, for purposes of con-
venience and justice, "to any other district ... where it might have been brought." But a
federal court in the demanding state does not have "jurisdiction" of a habeas corpus
action in the asylum state for purposes of § 2241(b) [see Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1948) ; but cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205 (1952)], nor is it a court in which the action "might have been brought" for
purposes of § 1404(a) (cf. 2 MooRs'S FEDERAL PRAcTicE tE 4.02[5] at 957-59 (1964) for
the restrictive view the federal courts have taken of this limitation on transfers). Assum-
ing these problems could be resolved, some equally serious ones remain. Who would be
the parties to the transferred cause? Clearly petitioner would be one - and therefore would
have to be transferred bodily into the demanding state, both to confer territorial jurisdic-
tion. on that state's federal court (but cf., perhaps, Jones v. Cunningham, supra) and to
enable him to make his case [see Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) discussed in
note 15 supra]. But could the asylum state remain the defendant [sued in the person of its
warden - see United States ex rel. Elliot v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 926-27 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954) for the intricacies of the defendant-party problem on
federal habeas corpus] ? On what grounds? If not, how could the cause be transferred?
Sweeping this objection under the rug arguendo, how could the demanding state, which
would have no custody of the petitioner, be made the defendant?
229. See note 228 supra.
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The purpose of the transfer would be, rather, to enable the transferee court
to consider a different question. The transferee court could consider directly
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the demanding state. Unlike the trans-
ferring court, the transferee court need not consider the issue raised by the
extraditee through the veil of the extradition process - that is, in terms of the
right to demand. But the notion of transferring a cause different from that
brought in the transferring court is most peculiar. The result could be ration-
alized by arguing that what the federal court in the asylum state would really
be doing is allowing extradition to proceed subject to the condition 210 that the
extraditee be delivered directly into the custody of a federal court in the de-
manding state,231 on the basis of a preliminary finding of the non-availability
or ineffectiveness of the demanding state's own remedies. There are some
serious difficulties with this mode of relief,232 and it does not avoid the neces-
sity of a preliminary finding in the asylum state that exhaustion in the de-
manding state is not called for. But if the wrinkles could be ironed out - by
courts, or by the courts with the aid of new legislation to make their power
clear - this conditional relief in the asylum state coupled with immediate
federal relief in the demanding state might well be a satisfactory resolution of
the problem of the proper scope of extradition habeas corpus. A less rigorous
standard of proof could be tolerated in the asylum state federal court, since
its finding would only be that petitioner is entitled to a federal hearing in the
demanding state prior to being returned to that state's custody; thus more
effective protection of extraditees' constitutional rights could be afforded. On
the other hand, substantial protection of state-federal comity would be effected
and issues would be allocated to the most convenient forums.233 Whatever the
230. Remand to custody subject to a condition is now a common form of relief on
habeas corpus. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
231. Effectuating this direct transfer of custody may be one of the tricklest problems
with the proposed conditional relief, since it would seem to involve the federal court in the
asylum state exercising some authority over court officers of the demanding state federal
court - i.e., they would have both to come and get the petitioner, and to accept custody
of him. The transferee court would also have to be cooperative.
232. The most severe is that of the jurisdiction of the transferee federal court to con-
sider claims concerning the constitutionality of the demanding state's behavior when the
prisoner is not in fact in state custody. If the federal courts are too hidebound by the
mystique of habeas corpus to treat the problem directly as one of creating a remedy to
fit the problem, they could invent a convenient fiction: the prisoner is really in the de-
manding state's custody, and is held only temporarily for the demanding state (just as
federal prisoners are sometimes held in state jails) by the federal court. This fiction is so
close to the truth that it might be palatable - the prisoner would be in federal custody,
after all, only because of the claim of the demanding state. But these difficulties associated
with habeas corpus might be avoided were the suit deemed one for an injunction to re-
strain the demanding state from proceeding further against the extraditce when the court
releases him - if the petitioner failed to make out his case, he would be released into the
unconditional (or, perhaps, conditional) custody of the demanding state.
233. The difference between one federal court (asylum state) and another (demand-
ing state) is largely an emotional one on the part of demanding states. See Sutherland,
Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271, 278-79 (1950), for a per-
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ultimate merits of this proposed remedy, not the least of the grounds for dis-
appointment with the Supreme Court's handling of the Johnson v. Dye and
Sweeney cases is the stifling effect they have had upon the creative initiative
of the lower federal courts in devising remedies to meet the problem. Now
that the legalistic spirit of that era of habeas corpus law has been repudiated,
one can expect the federal courts to be as imaginative in developing flexible
remedies on habeas corpus as Fay v. Noia indicates they will be with respect
to the availability of the writ.
suasive argument that, forum non conveniens apart, there is no real difference for a de-
manding state between having its institutions judged by one federal court or by another.
But because the difference is emotional does not mean it is not entitled to some %,eight
in the federalism scales.
